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F OREWORD

This snbmissi.on contains the text anc! commentary of
A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure in a Proposed
Official Draft that it is hoped the Institute will he preparPd
to promulgate this year.
':J.1he task of formulating a model statui<' governing
police powers and practice in criminal law enforcement and
related aspects of pre-trial procedure was assumed by the
Institute in 1963. The enterprise was undertaken in recognition of the difficulty and importance of the problems of
authority and of procc'dure calling for con~ideration in thi~
area, 1he developing Supreme Court interpretations of the
constitutional imperatives to be respected and the magnitude
of legislative interest in achie,·ing f'O far as possible an
acceptable :statutory delineation of the basic norms. These
considerations are even more significant today than when
the work began.
The late Professor Arthur E . Sutherland, who had
collaborated with .Judge Goodrich in proposing the project,
was designated the Reporter at the start. After a year of
preliminary study, Professor Sutherland resigned and was
succeeded in November 1964 by Professor James Vorcnberg,
under whose over all direction the Code and Comentary were
developed through the years . His collaborators on various
aspects of the effort were Professors Paul nL Bator, Eclward
L. Barrett, Arnold N. Enker, Charles Fried and Telford
Taylor. The reporters were in turn assisted by a distinguished and eclectic Advisory Committee, dnrwn from the
bench and bar (including specialists in prosecntiou and
defense), the law schools, the police and other agencies of
law enforcement. All of the members of the Advisory Committee on the Police Function of the American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal .Justice sen·ed as
Vll

.;§ttpTtmt t4nurlllf tfrt ~tihb .®tatts

'J.tasfringtM. tB. QJ.

21lc?J.I-;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . R EH NQUIST

June 22, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO · THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 82-1771 -- United States v. Leon

This case has been relisted together with the holds for
Illinois v. Gates, No. 81-430, and I have agreed to write a
memorandum discussing it.
Respondents w~re indicted for
violation of federal drug laws, and successfully moved to
suppress contraband seized by police · pursuant to aS search
warrant authorizing searcfi o f respondent's residences and
au t omobiles. The district court held that the search
~
warrant was unsupported by probable cause.
~
.

~

The affidavit in support of the warrant stated that a ~
.
confidential informant of unproven reliability told the
police that he knew two persons who were engaged in selling P~~
large quantities of drugs from their home. ·He provided the
address and said that some five months earlier he had been
present at a sale of drugs at the residence. The police
then initiated a month-long investigation, and observed
numerous known drug traffickers enter the home. They also
discovered that respondents frequented two other residences
in the area. A search of two of the respondents at an
airport revealed a quantity of marijuana. Based principally
on this information, a state court iud ~ issued a warrant
authorizing searches of the re sponde nts' residences and
automobiles.

~

The district court found that the informant's
reliability and credibility had not been established, and
thus that probable cause did not exist. The district judge
refused to recognize a good faith exception to th ea)
exclusionary rule. The Cou ~ f Appeals affirmed, relying
on Aguilar and Spinelli, an~lso declining to recognize an
exception to the exclusionary ru l e.

- 2 -

The petition for certiorari filed by the United States
expressly aec!i~ s to present the question whether th~ lower
courts im ro eri conc~ u d ed th a t pro ba ble cause to support
the warrant was lacKlng.
et. at , n. 0.
InsteaG; it
pr e se nt s only the question whether "the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the
~
admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith
~
defective."

-

A fairly . persuasive argument can be made that the
ecision below is inconsistent with the opinion for the
Court in Illinois v. Gates, and I suppose we have the powe ~
o GVR the case in light of Gates.
It also provides,
~
however, a useful vehicle for consideration of the
'~
reasonable good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
',,
On balance, I think the briefs in this case, which involves
a slightly different factual situation than does
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, No. 82-963, would provide useful
guidance if we should decide to formulate a good faith
exception.
I will vote to grant.

fl
.'

Sincerel~y

drk 06/11/83

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: No. 82-1771, United States v. Leon

Three cases currently are pending that present the good
faith exception to the Fourth Amendment.

-

Each arises out of a

slightly different factual situation and accordingly presents

,

differing considerations as to granting cert.

___
/l.;l

as follows:

/

The three cases are

~

No. 82-963, Massachusetts v. SheEEard--This is the "classic" good
faith case.

The officers sought a search and arrest warrant and the

judge filled it out improperly.

The officers, believing that the

warrant properly authorized a more extensive search than it did,
found evidence that led to resp's conviction for murder.
S. J. Ct.

reversed~

The Mass.

it found that the evidence should have been

excluded and explicitly rejected the State's good faith argument.

No. 82-1771, United States v. Leon--This case presents the same
factual situation that occurred in Illinois v. Gates.
,.-

The

--.....

magistrate issued a search warrant that was not valid in light of
the Aguillar-SEinelli test.

The police acted on the basis of the

2.

warrant and the evidence was suprressed over the United States'
argument that the good faith exception should be applied.

No. 82-1711, Colorado v. Quintero--This case presents the most far
reaching interpretation of the good faith exception.

It involves a

situation in which the police made a good faith, but mistaken
judgment that they have probable cause to make an arrest or search.

All three cases present the issue clearly, and there are
no judisdictional problems in any of them.

There are some

prudential concerns about taking either of the last two cases, most
significantly United States v. Leon.

Illinois v. Gates indicates

that CA9 improperly determined in Leon that the search warrant was
unconstitutional under the Aguillar-Spinelli test.

Although the SG

does not seek review of that determination, it is questionable
whether it would appear proper to decide the harder good-faith issue
when the simpler disposition of the case would be to GVR it in light
of Gates.

Similarly, the State in Colorado v. Quintero does not

challenge the propriety of the state court's reasoning that the
police lacked probable cause, but there are fairly strong facts
suggesting that the police did have probable cause (resp Quinterro
was identified as a possible burglary suspect, and was found with a
television set in a strange neighborhood and with heavy wool gloves
in his backpocket on a summer day.)

If there were disagreement on

the good-faith exception, there is a strong possibility that the
Court might end up going off, as it did in Illinois v. Gates, on the
ground that there was no Fourth Amendment violation.

3.

In terms of the possible holding, the first case-Massachusetts v. Sheppard--is clearly the narrowest.

It presents

the question whether the good faith exception applies to a technical
mistake or a mistake of fact.

Leon, the second case, presents th

broader issue of whether a mistaken determination by a neutral
that probable cause exists will justify application of the good
faith exception.

The third, Quintero, presents the

of all--whether the good faith exception applies whenever the police
themselves have a good faith belief that probable cause exists.
Perhaps because I tend to be cautious, I am inclined to think that
the first case is the best one to take.

Recognizing a good-faith

exception is a significant step and it would seem best to allow the
idea to develop in the lower courts on a case-by-case basis.
Further, Massachusetts v. Sheppard is the kind of case where it is
hard to say that the good faith exception is improper.

Thus, it

might provide a solid first step.
I have attached copies of the cert pool memos in Sheppard
and Leon.

Quinterro was on the June 9 Conference and I cannot find

where Ginny has filed it.
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To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

cases held for Illinois v. Gates, No. 81-430

We have

received hold memos

the two cases held
v. Quintero,

for~ llinois

a~ .

v.

from JUSTICE REHNQUIST in

Gate~o.

82-1711, Colorado

82-963, Massachusetts v. Sheppard.

ommends granting the former and holding the latter.

He rec-

This recom-

mendation is consistent with his views, but I do not think it is
consistent with yours.

Quintero is a case in which the police,

acting

thought

in

good

faith,

tli'a·t

they

had

probable

cause.

(They probably did--but the State does not seek review on that

(_z.\,

.......,ZI)

There was noj~sta~e of fact, or ~isplaced

fact-bound question.)

reliance on a warrant or
the State argues

~31tatute. later~eld

is that the officers had a good faith

that they had probable cause.
exception

here

standard.

would

only

All

belief

Thus the creation of a good faith

serve

to

lower

the

probable

cause

At the moment the police must have probable cause on

an objective basis.

Under the State's rule it will be enough if

------~------~

the police

in good

faith

think

even if they objectively do not.

I

to be invalid.

that

they have probable cause,

This is plainly inconsistent

with United States v. Johnson, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 2593 {1982).
Sheppard appears to be a much more appropriate case in

which

to consider

a

faith

factual error.

new rule.

In that case

there was

a good

The error did not affect the substantial

~

rights of the defendant.

This is the classic situation in which

a good faith rule should apply, for the exclusionary rule serves

little deterrent purpose.

It is true that this case is narrower

than some members of the Court may wish for the eventual scope of
the good faith exception, but that seems entirely appropriate for
a "first case."

It would be better for the Court to start with a

narrow case to announce that a good faith exception is acceptable
under

the

Fourth Amendment.

This would give

lower

courts

the

chance to experiment with the rule, leaving this Court with the
flexibility to proceed later in whatever manner seems appropriate
at the time.
I
good faith
82-1771,

understand that there are two more cases raising the
issue:

No.

United States

82-1800, Connecticut v.
v. v'Leon.

z indros

Zindros,

and No.

is on the Conference

list for June 23, but we have not yet received the pool memo yet.
It may be best to hold all of these cases for
Z indros.

discussion with

It is silly to take a case now simply for the sake of

reaching the issue if there is a better case coming.

~ Leon involves police reliance on a warrant later held to
be invalid for want of probable cause.

This would not be an ap-

propriate case in which to consider the issue for several reasons.

First, the decision below appears to be wrong on the mer-

its under Illinois v. Gates.
fore,

The appropriate resolution, there-

would be a GVR in light of Gates.

It makes no sense to

have a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule when there
was no Fourth Amendment violation to trigger the application of
the

rule.

Second,

if

there

was

a

Fourth Amendment

violation

here, it was in issuing a warrant on less than probable cause.

I

see no way that such an error {if there was one) can be described

as a "technical, trivial, or inadvertent" violation of the Fourth
Amendment.

Brewer

v.

Williams,

(POWELL, J., concurring).

430 U.S.

387,

414 n.

2

(1977)

Issuing a warrant on less than proba-

ble cause violates the plain language at the very heart of the
Fourth Amendment:
cause."
----:..-

Third,

"no warrants

shall

issue,

but

------------------------faith

application of a good

upon

probable

exception

in this

case would have the effect of insulating virtually every warrant
decision of

---

a magistrate from appellate

- -

review.

---------

This lack of

appellate review would be intolerable when one remembers that (i)
proceedings before the magistrate are invariably ex parte,
the magistrate is not necessarily a lawyer,

(ii)

(iii) the police gen-

erally can select the magistrate to whom the request for a warrant is directed,
warrant,

the

and

police

(iv)
may

if a magistrate declines to issue a

still

third, or fourth magistrate.

seek

a

warrant

from

a

second,

It is proper, of course, to give

considerable deference to magistrate's decisions despite all of
these problems.

But the possibilities for

abuse are too great

when there is no realistic avenue of appellate review.

Finally,

the Court will get little help from the lower court in this case.
CA9 affirmed the DC by order.
faith exception was as follows:

Its full discussion of the good
"We have not heretofore recog-

nized such an exception and we decline the invitation to recognize one at this juncture."

Although this Court may need little

help in deciding whether or not there should be a good faith exception, it would be very helpful to have opinions below considering how such an exception would apply in the circumstances of
the particular case at issue.
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No. 82-1771
UNITED STATES

Cert to CA9 ( ang,
Fergerson; Ken dy
dissenting)

v.

c5?L__

LEO~
1.

~
~

Federal/Criminal

SUMMARY:

Timely

Whether the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule

should be modified to allow admission of evidence seized in
reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant subsequently
held to be defective.
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS:

Resps were indicted for

possession with intent to distribute cocaine and conspiracy.
Resps successfully moved to suppress contraband and other

11u_ <-t ~

A~

---.-r

i ~~~

~ ... ~)- ~~ -t. '--

-2-

evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant authorizing the
search of residences and automobiles belonging to them.

The DC

found that the search warrant was not supported by probable
cause.
The

~ fidavit

in support of the search warrant alleged that
-----·~
· ----~

a confidential informant of unproven reliab lity told a police
officer that he knew two persons who were selling large
quantities of cocaine and methaqualone from their residence.

He

provided an address, and stated that he had been present at the
residence 5 months earlier and had witnessed the sale of drugs.
On receipt of this information, the Burbank police department

r

instituted a month-long investigation, during which a number of
individuals known to be involved in drug trafficking visited the
residence.

A small amount of marijuana was also found in the

possession of two residents who were searched, with their
consent, by airport narcotics officers.

On this information, a

~search warrant was issued authorizing the search of the

residences and automobiles involved.

In the ensuing searches,

police officers seized significant amounts of cocaine and
methaqualone tablets.
The DC suppressed the evidence finding that there was "no
question" that the reliability and credibility of the informant
had not been established.

The DC rejected the government's

argument that the exclusionary rule should not apply when
evidence is seized in reasonable good-faith reliance on a search
warrant, but observed that the officers acted in good faith.
On interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of CA9 affirmed the

-3-

suppression order.

The majority held that the information

supplied by the informant was stale in part and inadequate under
both prongs of the Aquilar-Spinelli test and that the. police
investigation was insufficient to collaborate the informants'
information.

Finally, the majority declined to recognize a good'------

faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

Judge Kennedy

dissented, concluding that the informants' information was both
sufficiently current and adequately collaborated by the police
investigation.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The SG maintains that this case raises the

same issue now pending before the court following reargument in
Illinois v. Gates, No. 81-430.

In Gates, or alternatively in

this case, the Court is presented with an opportunity to examine
the policies of the exclusionary rule as they relate to evidence
obtained pursuant to a warrant.

This case will either be

controlled by the decision in Gates or it will present a suitable
independent vehicle for resolution of this question.
expressly does not seek review on the

probable~

The SG
issue,

stating that it is fact-bound and not independently worthy of
this Court's consideration.

v--

Resp answers that there was no valid judicial finding of
subjective good-faith in this case: and that state law should
have been applied in this case because the search warrant and the
supporting affidavit were prepared and signed by state police
officers.
4.

DISCUSSION:

This case presents a suitable opportunity

for the Court to consider whether to adopt a good-faith exception

-4-

to the exclusionary rule for searches conducted pursuant to a
warrant.

-- ----------

The issue was squarely raised and rejected below.

-

As

it is a federal case, there is no state law concern • . The only
potential problem is that the decision on probable cause is now
highly questionable in light of Ill. v. Gates.

But the United

States expressly does not present this issue and under

s.

Ct.

Rule 21, "only the questions set forth in the petn or fairly
included therein will be considered by the Court."
I recommend that the petn be considered together with
Massachusetts v. Shepherd No. 82-963, whi'ch also poses the goodfaith issue and has been

held for Illinois v. Gates.

There is a response.
June 8, 1983
dag

Singer

Opin in petn.
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
~ - _l ~
This case presents the question whether the Fourth ~~~Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to
bar the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of evidence ob- ~
. /)
tained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search
V
warrant issuea by a detached ana neutral magistrate but ulti0
ma~upported by probable cause. TOresolve this question, we must consider once again the tension
between the sometimes competing goals of, on the one hand,
deterring official misconduct and removing inducements to
unreasonable invasions of privacy and, on the other, establishing procedures under which criminal defendants are "acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S.
JUSTICE WHITE

1-r.r

165, 175 (1969).

I
In August 1981, a confidential informant of unproven reli<!21lity informed an officer of the Burbank Police Department
that two persons known to him as "Armando" and "Patsy"
were selling large quantities of cocaine and methaqualone
from their residence at 620 Price Drive in Burbank, Cal.
The informant also indicated that he had witnessed a sale of
methaqualone ny "Patsy" a~nceapprox1mately five
months earlier and had observed at that time a shoebox containing a farge amount of cash that belonged to "Patsy." He

-----
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further declared that "Armando" and "Patsy" generally kept
'ohly small quantities of drugs at their residence and stored
the remainder at another location in Burbank.
On the basis of this information, the Burbank police initiated an extensive investigation focusing first on the Price
Drive reSI~ two other residences as well.
Cars parked at the Price Drive residence were determined to
belong to respondents Armando Sanchez, who had previously
been arrested for possession of marihuana, and Patsy Stewart, who had no criminal record. During the course of the
investigation, officers observed an automobile belonging to
respondent Ricardo Del Castillo, who had previously been arrested for possession of 50 pounds of marihuana, arrive at the
Price Drive residence. The driver of that car entered the
house, exited shortly thereafter carrying a small paper sack,
and drove away. A check of Del Castillo's probation records
led the officers to respondent Alberto Leon, whose telephone
number Del Castillo had listed as his employer's. Leon had
been arrested in 1980 on drug charges and a companion had
informed the police at that time that Leon was heavily involved in the importation of drugs into this country. Before
the current investigation began, the Burbank officers had
learned that an informant had told a Glendale police officer
that Leon stored a large quantity of methaqualone at his residence in Glendale. During the course of this investigation,
the Burbank officers learned that Leon was living at 716
South Sunset Canyon in Burbank.
Subsequently, the officers observed several persons, at
least one of whom had prior drug involvement, arriving at
the Price Drive residence and leaving with small packages;
observed a variety of other material activity at the two residences as well as at a condominium at 7902 Via Magdalena;
and witnessed a variety of relevant activity involving respondents' automobiles. The officers also observed respondents Sanchez and Stewart board separate flights for Miami.

.... ..,

... ,' .

~
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The pair later returned to Los Angeles together, consented
·. ··· · · to a search of their luggage that revealed only a small amount
of marihuana, and left the airport. Based on these and other
observations summarized in the affidavit, App. 34, Officer
Cyril Rombach of the Burbank Police Department, an experienced and well-trained narcotics investigator, prepared an
application for a warrant to search 620 Price Drive, 716 South
Sunset Canyon, 7902 Via Magdalena, and automobiles registered to each of the respondents for an extensive list of items
believed to be related to respondents' drug-trafficking activities. Officer Rombach's extensive application was reviewed
by several Deputy District Attorneys.
A ac1a y va 1 searc warrant was issued in September
1981 oy a state~r c'Otirt judge. The ensuing searches
produced large quantities of drugs at the Via Magdalena and
Sunset Canyon addresses and a small quantity at the Price
Drive residence. Other evidence was discovered at ~ach of
the ~s and in Stewart's ano Del Castillo's automobiles. Respondents were indicted by a grand jury in the District Court for the Central District of California and charged
with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and a varih ~stantive counts.
The respondents then filed motions to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. 1 The District Court
held an evidentiary hearing and, while recognizing that the
., . . .

';

.•.: . . ·.. :··

1

Responde~t Leo~ ~oved to supp~ess the evidence found ~n his person

at the time of his arrest and the evidence seized from his residence at 716
South Sunset Canyon. Respondent Stewart's motion covered the fruits of
searches of her residence at 620 Price Drive and the condominium at 7902
Via Magdalena and statements she made during the search of her residence. Respondent Sanchez sought to suppress the evidence discovered
during the search of his residence at 620 Price Drive and statements he
made shortly thereafter. He also joined Stewart's motion to suppress evidence seized from the condominium. Respondent Del Castillo apparently
sought to suppress all of the evidence seized in the searches. App. 78-80.
The respondents also moved to suppress evidence seized in the searches of
their automobiles.

I, '
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case was a close one, see App. 131, anted the motions to /)
suppress in part. It conCluded that the affidavit was ins fficient to establish probable cause, 2 but did not suppress all of
the evidence as to all of the respondents because none of the
respondents had standing to challenge all of the searches. 3
In response to a request from the Government, the court
made clear that Officer Rombach had acted in good faith, but
it rejected the Government's suggestion that the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule should not apply where evidence is seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search
warrant. 4

L...

2

"I just cannot find this warrant sufficient for a showing of probable
cause.
There is no question of the reliability and credibility of the informant as
not being established.
~en tended to corroborate, maybe, the reliability of [the
informant's] information about the previous transaction, but if it is not a
stale transaction, it comes awfully close to it; and all the other material I
think is as consistent with innocence as it is with guilt.
So I just do not think this affidavit can withstand the test. I find, then,
that there is no probable cause in this case for the issuance of the search
warrant ... ." App. 127.
8
The District Court concluded that Sanchez and Stewart had standing to
challenge the search of 620 Price Drive; that Leon had standing to contest
the legality of the search of 716 South Sunset Canyon; that none of the re- spondEmts had established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the condominium at 7902 Via Magdalena; and that Stewart and Del Castillo each had
standing to challenge the searches of their automobiles. The Government
indicated that it did not intend to introduce evidence seized from the other
respondents' vehicles. App. 127-129. Finally, the court suppressed
statements given by Sanchez and Stewart. Id., at 129-130.
' "On the issue of good faith, obviously that is not the law of the Circuit,
and I am not going to apply that law.
I will say certainly in my view, there is not any question about good
faith. [Officer Rombach] went to a Superior Court judge and got a warrant; obviously laid a meticulous trail. Had surveilled for a long period of
time, and I believe his testimony-and I think he said he consulted with

..

.~. ~

.
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The District Court denied the Government's motion for re/1- ~
consideration, App. 147, and a divided panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ~d. It first concluded
that Officer Rombach's affidavit could not establish probable ~ ~
cause to search the Price Drive residence. To the extent ~
that the affidavit set forth facts demonstrating the basis of
the informant's knowledge of criminal activity, the information included was fatally stale. The affidavit, moreover,
failed to establish the mformant's credibility. Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals cone u e t at the information provided
by the informant was inadequate under both prongs of the
two-part test established in Aguilar v. Texas, 375 U. S. 108
(1964), and Spinelli v. Uniteasrates, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). 5
The officers~pendent investigation neither cured the
staleness nor corroborated the details of the informant's declarations. The Court of Appeals then considered whether
the affidavit formed a proper basis for the search of the Sunset Canyon residence. In its view, the affidavit included no
facts indicating the basis for the informants' statements concerning respondent Leon's criminal activities and was devoid
of information establishing the informants' reliability. Because these deficiencies had not been cured by the police investigation, the District Court properly suppressed the fruits
of the search. The Court of Appeals refused the Government's invitation to recognize a good-faith exception to the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Petn. for Cert. 4(a).
... . .'··· .....
· The ·Government's petition for certiorari expressly de- 5~>
clined to seek review of the lower courts' determinations that
~· d
the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause and ;f.:L~~ ~

C:.

6- .

three Deputy District Attorneys before proceeding himself, and I certainly
have no doubt about the fact that that is true." App. 140.
5
In Illinois v. Gates, - U. S. (1983), decided last Term, the
Court abandoned the two-pronged Aquilar-Spinelli test for determining
whether aiiTnrormanT s tip suffices to establish probable· cause for the issuance of a warrant and substituted in its place a "totality of the circumstances" approach.
- -

~

erf~
~~
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presented only the question "[w]hether the Fourth Amendment exclusi.onary rule should be modified so as not to bar the
admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective." We granted certiorari to consider the propriety of
such a modification. - - U. S. - - (1983). Although it
undoubtedly is within our power to consider the question
whether probable cause existed under the "totality of the circumstances" test announced last Term in Illinois v. Gates,
- - U. S. - - (1983), that question has not been briefed or
argued; and it is also within our authority, which we choose
to exercise, to take the case as it comes to us, accepting the
Court of Appeals' conclusion that probable cause was lacking
under the prevailing legal standards. See This Court's Rule

..... .

21.1(a).

We have concluded that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule can be modified somewhat without jeopardizing its
ability to perform its intended functions. Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II

• • '!. :.. \

i'

~

J

#.

Language in opinions of this Court and of individual Justices has sometimes implied that the exclusionary rule is a
necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 651, 655-657 (1961) (plurality opinion);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 462-463 (1928), or
that the rule is required by the conjunction of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. Mapp v. Ohio, supra, at 661-662
(Black, J., concurring); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S.
20, 33-34 (1925). These implications need not detain us long.
The Fifth Amendment theory has not withstood critical analysis or the test of time, see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S.
463 (1976), and the Fourth Amendment "has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally sejzed evidence in all proceedings or against all persons." V'Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (1976).
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A

The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly
precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its
commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes
makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or
seizure "work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong."
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 354 (1974). The
wrong condemned by the Amendment is "fully accomplished"
by the unlawful search or seizure itself, ibid., and the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to "cure the invasion
of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered."
Stone v. Powell, supra, at 540 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
The rule thus operates as "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the person aggrieved." United States v.
Calandra, supra, at 348.
Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case, our decisions make clear, is "an
issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct." Illinois v. Gates, supra, at - - .
Only the former question is currently before us, and it must
be resolved by wei hin the costs and benefits of reventing
th~ prosecution's· case-in~chief of i@erently trustworthy tangi_ble evidence obtained in reliance on a search
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that ultimately is found to be defective.
The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary
rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have
long been a source of concern. "Our cases have consistently
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and

~ ·~ >.~.··.•.:
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jury." United States v. Payner, 447 U. S. 727, 734 (1980).
An objectionable collateral consequence of this interference
with the criminal justice system's truth-finding function is
that some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced
sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains. 6 Particu-

-;.

• ..• i .

6
Researchers have only recently begun to study extensively the effects
of the exclusionary rule on the disposition of felony arrests. One study
suggests that the rule results in the nonprosecution or nonconviction of between 0.6% and 2.35% of individuals arrested for felonies. Davies, A
Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs"
of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 A. B. F. Res. J. 611, 621 (forthcoming). The estimates are
higher for particular crimes the prosecution of which depends heavily on
physical evidence. Thus, the cumulative loss due to nonprosecution or
nonconviction of individuals arrested on felony drug charges is probably in
the range of2.8% to 7.1%. !d., at 680. Davies' analysis of California data
suggests that screening by police and prosecutors results in the release because of illegal searches or seizures of as many as 1.4% of all felony arrestees, id., at 650, that 0. 9% of felony arrestees are released because of illegal
searches or seizures at the preliminary hearing or after trial, id., at 653,
and that roughly 0.5% of all felony arrestees benefit from reversals on appeal because of illegal searches. I d., at 654. See also K. Brosi, A CrossCity Comparison of Felony Case Processing 16, 1~19 (1979); Report of the
Comptroller General of the United States, Impact of the Exclusionary
Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions 10-11, 14 (1979); F. Feeney, F. Dill
& A. Weir, Arrests Without Convictions: How Often They Occur and Why
203-206 (1983); National Institute of Justice, The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in California 1-2 (1982); Nardulli, The Societal Cost of
the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 A. B. F. Res. J.
585, 600 (forthcoming). The exclusionary rule also has been found to affect the plea-bargaining process. S. Schlesinger, Exclusionary Injustice:
The Problem of Illegally Obtained Evidence 63 (1977). But see Davies,
supra, at 66~69; Nardulli, supra, at 604-606.
Many of these researchers have concluded that the impact of the exclusionary rule is insubstantial, but the small percentages with which they
deal mask a large absolute number of felons who are released because the
cases against them were based in part on illegal searches or seizures.
"[A]ny rule of evidence that denies the jury access to clearly probative and
reliable evidence must bear a heavy burden of justification, and must be
carefully limited to the circumstances in which it will pay its way ~
ring official unlawlessness." Illinois v. Gates , - - U. S. - - , - -

,·
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larly when law enforcement officers have acted in good faith
: . <;>r th_ei:r: transgressions have been minor,. the magnitude. of
the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic
concepts of the criminal justice system. Stone v. Powell,
supra, at 490. Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary
rule, therefore, may well "generat[e] disrespect for the law
and the administration of justice." Id., at 491. Accordingly, "[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the
rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." United
States v. Calandra, supra, at 348; see Stone v. Powell,
supra, at 486-487; United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 447

....

(1976).

,.,~,
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'•

'

,· • ....... I :
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B
Close attention to those remedial objectives has characterized our recent decisions concerning the scope of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule. The Court has, to be sure,
not seriously questioned, "in the absence of a more efficacious
sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress evidence from the [prosecution's] case where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate. . . ."
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171 (1978); Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492. Nevertheless, the balancing approach
that has evolved in various contexts-including criminal trials-"forcefully suggest[s] that the exclusionary rule be more
generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence ob. tained in the :reasonable good-faith belief that a search or sei. ~ure was in accord ·with the Fourth Amendment." Illinois
v. Gates, supra, at - - (WHITE, J., concurring in the
judgment).
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), the Court emphasized the costs of the exclusionary rule, expressed its view
(1983) (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment). Because we find that the
rule can have no substantial deterrent effect in the sorts of situatio~ 5
consideration in this case, see post, a t -, we conclude that it cannot pay
its way in those situations.

.......
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that limiting the circumstances under which Fourth Amendment claims could be raised in federal habeas corpus proceedings would not reduce the rule's deterrent effect, id., at
489-495, and held that a state prisoner who has been afforded
a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment
claim may not obtain federal habeas relief on the ground that
unlawfully obtained evidence had been introduced at his trial.
Cf. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 560-563 (1979). Proposed extensions of the exclusionary rule to proceedings
other than the criminal trial itself have been evaluated and
rejected under the same analytic approach. In United
States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), for example, we declined to allow grand jury witnesses to refuse to answer questions based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search or
seizure since "[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might
be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings
is uncertain at best." Id., at 348. Similarly, in United
States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), we permitted the use in
federal civil proceedings of evidence illegally seized by state
officials since the likelihood of deterring police misconduct
through such an extension of the exclusionary rule was insufficient to outweigh its substantial social costs. In so doing,
we declared that, "[i]f ... the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted." ld., at 454.
As cases considering the use of unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal trials themselves make clear, it does not follow from the emphasis on the exclusionary rule's deterrent
value that "anything which deters illegal searches is thereby
commanded by the Fourth Amendment." Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S., at 174. In determining whether
persons aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence unlawfully obtained from their co-conspirators or codefendants could seek suppression, for example, we found
that the additional benefits of such an extension of the exclusionary rule would not outweigh its costs. I d., at 174-175.
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Standing to invoke the rule has thus been limited to cases in
which the prosecution seeks to use the fruits of an illegal
search or seizure against the victim of police misconduct.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 (1978); Brown v. United
States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963). Cf. United States v. Payner, 447
u. s. 727 (1980).
Even defendants with standing to challenge the introduction in their criminal trials of unlawfully obtained evidence
cannot prevent every conceivable use of such evidence. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief may be used to
impeach a defendant's direct testimony. Walder v. United
States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). See also Oregon v. Hass, 420
U. S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971).
A similar assessment of the "incremental furthering" of the
ends of the exclusionary rule led us to conclude in United
States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 627 (1980), that evidence inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief or otherwise as
substantive evidence of guilt may be used to impeach statements made by a defendant in response to "proper crossexamination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct
examination." ld., at 627-628.
When considering the use of evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment in the prosecution's case-in-chief,
moreover, we have declined to adopt a per se or but for rule
that would render inadmissible any evidence that came to
light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal
arrest. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun
v. United States, supra, at 487-488. We also have held that
a witness' testimony may be admitted even when his identity
was discovered in an unconstitutional search. United States
v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 (1978). The perception underlying these decisions-that the connection between police misconduct and evidence of crime may be sufficiently attenuated
to permit the use of that evidence at trial-is a product of

.~

::

. . ..
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considerations relating to the exclusionary rule and the constitutional principles it is designed to protect. Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U. S. 200, 217-218 (1979); United States v.
Ceccolini, supra, at 279. 7 In short, the "dissipation of the
taint" concept that the Court has applied in deciding whether
exclusion is appropriate in a particular case "attempts to
mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost."
Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 609 (POWELL, J., concurring in
part). Not surprisingly in view of this purpose, an assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an
important step in the calculus. Dunaway v. New York,
supra, at 218; Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 603-604.
The same attention to the purposes underlying the exclusionary rule also has characterized decisions not involving the
scope of the rule itself. We have not required suppression of
the fruits of a search incident to an arrest made in good-faith
reliance on a substantive criminal statute that subsequently
is declared unconstitutional. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U. S. 31 (1979). 8 Similarly, although the Court has been un-

'· ·

7

I

•''

"Brown's focus on 'the causal connection between the illegality and the
confession' . . . reflected the two policies behind the use of the exclusionary
rule to effectuate the Fourth Amendment. Where there is a close causal
connection between the illegal seizure and the confession, not only is exclusion of evidence more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the fu. 't\rre, but use of the evidence is more likeiy to compromise the integrity of
the courts." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 217-218 (1979) (citation omitted).
8
We have held, however, that the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence obtained in searches carried out pursuant to statutes, not
yet declared unconstitutional, purporting to authorize searches and seizures without probable cause or search warrants. See, e. g., Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 (1979); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New
York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967).
"Those decisions involved statutes which, by their own terms, authorized
searches under circumstances which did not satisfy the traditional warrant

............ :·, '·.
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willing to conclude that new Fourth Amendment principles
are always to have only prospective effect, United States v.
Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 560 (1982), 9 no Fourth Amendment
decision marking a "clear break with the past" has been applied retroactively. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S.
531 (1975); Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244 (1969);
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965). 10 The propriety
of retroactive application of a newly announced Fourth
Amendment principle, moreover, has been assessed largely
in terms of the contribution retroactivity might make to the
and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment." Michigan
v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, 39 (1979). The substantive Fourth Amendment principles announced in those cases are fully consistent with our holding here.
9
The Court held in United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537 (1982), that
a construction of the Fourth Amendment that did not constitute a "clear
break with the past" is to be applied to all convictions not yet final when
the decision was handed down. The limited holding, see id., at 562,
turned in part on the Court's judgment that "[f]ailure to accord any retroactive effect to Fourth Amendment rulings would 'encourage police or
other courts to disregard the plain purport of our decisions and to adopt a
let's-wait-until-it's-decided approach."' Id., at 561 (emphasis in original),
quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 277 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting). Contrary to respondents' assertions, nothing in Johnson precludes adoption of a good-faith exception tailored to situations in which the
police have reasonably relied on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral
magistrate but later found to be defective.
10
Our retroactivity decisions have, for the most part, turned on our assessments of "(a) the purpose.. to be served by the neW' stand8.rds, (b) the

extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards,
and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 297 (1967).
As we observed earlier this Term,
"In considering the reliance factor, this Court's cases have looked primarily to whether law enforcement authorities and state courts have justifiably relied on a prior rule of law said to be different from that announced
by the decision whose retroactivity is at issue. Unjustified 'reliance' is no
bar to retroactivity. This inquiry is often phrased in terms of whether the
new decision was foreshadowed by earlier cases or was a 'clear break with
the past."' Solem v. Stumes, No. 81-2149, circulating draft at 7-8.
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deterrence of police misconduct. United States v. Johnson,
supra, at 560-561; United States v. Peltier, supra, at
536--539, 542.

As yet, we have not recognized any form of good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. 11 But
the balancing approach that has evolved during the years of
experience with the rule provides strong support for the
modification currently urged upon us. As we discuss below,
our evaluation of the costs and benefits of su ressin reliable physical evi~nce se1ze by o ficers reasonably rel~ng
on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate
leads to the~ that sucll eVIdenceShoulabe admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief.

., .. ': .

~..

' ~

:-

.·

•.

III
A
Because a search warrant "provides the detached scrutiny
of a neutral ma"glstrate, which is a more reliable safeguard
against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a
law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,"' United States v. Chadwick,
433 U. S. 1, 9 (1971) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333
U. S. 10, 14 (1948)), we have expressed a strong preference
for warrants and declared that "in a doubtful or marginal case
a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without
one it would fail." . United States v. Ventresca, . 380 U. S.
102, 106 (1965). · ·see 'Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 111
11
Members of the Court have, however, urged reconsideration of the
scope of the ~clusionary rule. See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465,
496 (1976)~URGER, C. J., concurring); id., at 536 j WHITE, J., dissenting);
Illinois v. Gates,- U . S . - , - (1983) lWHITE, J., con_c!}l'l'ing in
the judgment); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 60~12 (1975) '(l>owELL,
J., concurring in part); California v. Minjares, 443 U. S. 916 (1979)
\,/1REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from denial of stay). One Court of Appeals,
no doubt influenced by these individual urgings, has adopted a form of
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. United States v. Williams,
622 F. 2d 830 (CA5 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1127 (1981).

s

.·.• ...:.
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(1964). Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particUlar affi<fiiVirestaNislies prooable
cause, and we have tlitrseoncrudeo that the preferenc~ · !or
warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according
\:"gt:12at deferen~ to a magistrates etermination-:--Spinelli
v. United States, 393 ~969). See Illinois v.
Gates, - - U. S. - - , - - (1983); United States v.
Ventresca, supra, at 108--109.
Deferenc~() the ~ate, however, is not boundless.
It is ctear,liTst:tflat, the deference accorded to a magistrate's
finding of probable cause does not preclude inquiry into the
kno~ng or reckless falsityof the affidavit on which that
determ1nati6n was based. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S.
154 (1978). 12 Second, the courts must also insist that the((
magistrate purport to "perform his 'neutral and detached'
function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police." Aguilar v. Texas, supra, at 111. See Illinois v.
Gates, supra, at--. A magistrate failing to "manifest that
neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer
when presented with a warrant application" and who acts instead as "an adjunct law enforcement officer" cannot provide
valid authorization for an otherwise unconstitutional search.
Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U. S. 319, 326-327 (1979).
Third, reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based
on an affidav1
at oes no provide the magistrate Wl a
suOst:antlaTbasis for determining e ex1s ence o probable
cause. " llltnois v. ?JiiteS;supra, at
"Sufficient' informatfon must be presented to the magistrate to allow that
official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a
mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others." Ibid.
See Aguilar v. Texas, supra; Giordenello v. United States,
357 U. S. 480 (1958); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S.
12
Indeed, "it would be an unthinkable imposition upon [the magistrate's]
authority if a warrant affidavit, revealed after the fact to contain a deliberately or recklessly false statement, were to stand beyond impeachment."
438 U. S., at 165.
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41 (1933). 13 Even if the warrant application was supported
by more than a "bare bones" affidavit, a reviewing court may
properly conclude that, notwithstanding the deference that
magistrates deserve, the warrant was invalid because the
magistrate's probable-cause determination reflected an improper analysis of the totality of the circumstances, Illinois
v. Gates, supra, at--, or because the form of the warrant
was improper in some respect.
Only in the first of these three situations, however, has the
Court set forth a rationale for suppressing evidence obtained
pursuant to a search warrant; in the other areas, it has simply excluded such evidence without considering whether
Fourth Amendment interests will be advanced. To the extent that proponents of exclusion rely on its behavioral effe5ts on judges and magistrates in these areas, their re_liance
is misplaced. First, the exclusionary rule 'rs designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of
judges and magistrates. Second, there exists no evidence
suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore
or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness
among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion. 14
13
See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964), in which the Court concluded that "the record ... does not contain a single objective fact to support a belief by the officers that the petitioner was engaged in criminal activity at the time they arrested. him." Id., at 95. Although the Court was
willing to assume that the arresting officers acted in good faith, it concluded that
"'good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough.' Henry v.
United States, 361 U. S. 98, 102. If subjective good faith alone were the
test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the
people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only
in the discretion of the police." Id., at 97.
We adhere to this view and emphasize that nothing in this opinion is intended to suggest a lowering of the probable cause standard. On the contrary, we deal here only with the remedy to be applied to a concededly unconstitutional search.
"Although there are assertions that some magistrates become rubberJ
stamps for the police and others may be unable effectively to screen police

...

~·
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Third, and most important, we discern ,...---._.,_
no basis, and are offered none, for ~believing that exc~o of evidence seized
pursuant to a warrant will have a signficant deterrent effect
on tnei8Su1ng judge or magistrate. 15 Many of the factors
that indicate tFiattlie exclusionary rule cannot provide an effective "special" or "general" deterrent for individual offending law enforcement officers 16 apply as well to judges or magistrates. And, to the extent that the rule is thought to
operate as a "systemic" deterrent on a wider audience, 17 it
conduct, see, e. g., 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure§ 4.1 (1978); Kamisar,
Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis"
Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 Creighton L. Rev. 565,
569-571 (1983); Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 Geo. L. J. 1361, 1412 (1981), we
are not convinced that this is a problem of major pro ortions. See L. TIT:
fany, . c n yre
. o en erg, DetectiOn o rime 119 (1967); Israel,
Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren
Court, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1319, 1414, n. 396 (1977); P. Johnson, New Approaches to Enforcing the Fourth Amendment 8-10 (Working Paper, Sept.
1978), quoted in Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure 229-230 (5th ed. 1980); R. Van Duizend, L. Sutton & C. Carter, The
Search Warrant Process ch. 7 (Review Draft, 1983).
15
As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized in Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 506, - - N. E. 2d - - , - (1982):
"The exclusionary rule may not be well tailored to deterring judicial misconduct. If applied to judicial misconduct, the rule would be just as costly
.as it is when it is applied to police misconduct, but it may be ill-fitted to the
job-created motivations of judges. . . . · [l]deally a judge is impartial as
to whether a particular piece of evidence is admitted or a particular defendant convicted. Hence, in the abstract, suppression of a particular piece of
evidence may not be as effective a disincentive to a neutral judge as it
would be to the police. It may be that a ruling by an appellate court that a
search warrant was unconstitutional would be sufficient to deter similar
misconduct in the future by magistrates."
But see United States v. Karanthanos, 531 F. 2d 26, 33-34 (CA2), cert.
denied, 428 U. S. 910 (1976).
" See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498 (1976) (BURGER, C. J.,
concurring); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 709-710 (1970).
17
See, e. g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,221 (1979) (STEVENS,

.........'' .. ·-·.
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clearly can have no such effect on individuals empowered to
issue search warrants. Judges and . magistrates are not
adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal
prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them. Imposition of the exclusionary sanction is not necessary meaningfully to inform judicial officers of their errors, and we cannot conclude that
admitting evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant while at
the same time declaring that the warrant was somehow defective will in any way reduce judicial officers' professional
incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment, encourage
them to repeat their mistakes, or lead to the granting of all
colorable warrant requests. 18

I

B

If exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequently invalidated warrant is to have any deterrent effect,
therefore, it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their departments. One
could argue that applying the exclusionary rule in cases
where the police failed to demonstrate probable cause in the
J., concurring); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 Geo.
L. J. 365, 399-401 (1981).
18
Limiting the application of the exclusionary sanction may well increase
the care . with which magistrates scrutinize warrant applications. We
··· .' ·~:
doubt that magistrates are more desirous of avoiding the exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to warrants they have issued than of avoiding invasions of privacy. To the extent that a good-faith exception is perceived]
. - . ' .£
as shifting responsibility for protecting privacy from reviewing courts to - - ~
magistrates, it may have beneficial effects on magistrates' performance.
Federal magistrates, moreover, are subject to the direct supervision of j
district courts. They may be removed for "incompetency, misconduct, net:( ~
glect of duty, or physical or mental disability." 20 U. S. C. § 631(1). If a
·/
magistrate serves merely as a "rubber stamp" for the police or is unable to
exercise mature judgment, closer supervision or removal provides a more
effective remedy than the exclusionary rule.

. · . ·,
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warrant application deters future inadequate presentations
or "magistrate shopping" and thus promotes the ends of the
Fourth Amendment. Suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a technically defective warrant supported by probable
cause also might encourage officers to scrutinize more closely
the form of the warrant and to point out suspected judicial
errors. We find such arguments speculative and conclude
that suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant
should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in
those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule. 19
We have frequently questioned whether the exclusionary \
rule can have any deterrent effect when the offending officers
acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. "No empirical researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet been
able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a
deterrent effect .... " United States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at
452, n. 22. But even assuming that the rule effectively deters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the
law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and
should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.
As we observed in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 447
(1974), and reiterated in United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S.,
... at 539:
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope
Our discussion of the deterrent effect of excluding evidence obtained in
reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated warrant assumes, of
course, that the officers properly executed the warrant and confined their
search to limits specified in the warrant.
19

'
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to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official con.:
duct was pursued in complete good faith, however, the
deterrence rationale loses much of its force."
The Peltier Court continued, id., at 542:
"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly
be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment."
See also Illinois v. Gates, - - U. S., at - - (WHITE, J.,
concurring in the judgment); United States v. Janis, supra,
at 459; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S., at 610-611 (POWELL, J.,
concurring in part). 20 In short, where the officer's conduct is
objectively reasonable,
We emphasize that the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an objective one. Many objections to a good-faith exception assume that the
exception will turn on the subjective good faith of individual officers.
"Grounding the modification in objective reasonableness, however, retains
the value of the exclusionary rule as an incentive for the law enforcement
profession as a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth
Amendment." Illinois v. Gates, - - U.S. - - , - - , n. 15 (1983)
(WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment); see Dunaway v. New York, 442
U. S. 200, 221 (1979) (STEVENS, J., concurring). The objective standard
·We adopt, moreover, requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge· of
what the law prohibits. United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 542
(1975). As Professor Jerold Israel has observed:
"The key to the [exclusionary] rule's effectiveness as a deterrent lies, I believe, in the impetus it has provided to police training programs that make
officers aware of the limits imposed by the fourth amendment and emphasize the need to operate within those limits. [An objective good-faith exception] ... is not likely to result in the elimination of such programs,
which are now viewed as an important aspect of police professionalism.
Neither is it likely to alter the tenor of those programs; the possibility that
illegally obtained evidence may be admitted in borderline cases is unlikely
to encourage police instructors to pay less attention to fourth amendment
20
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"excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the
. exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that ... the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act under the circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect
his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to
do his duty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 539-540
(WHITE, J., dissenting).
This is particularly true, we believe, when an officer acting
with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from
a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope. 21 In most
such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter. It is the magistrate's responsibility to determine
whether the officer's allegations establish probable cause
and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary
case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that
the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. "[O]nce the
warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman
can do in seeking to comply with the law." Id., at 498 (BURGER, C. J., concurring). Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.
limitations. Finally, [it] ... should not encourage officers to pay less attention to what they are taught, as the requirement that the officer act in
'good faith' is inconsistent with closing one's mind to the possibility of illegality." Israel, supra note 13, at 1412-1413 (footnotes omitted).
21
According to the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime, the
situation in which an officer relies on a duly authorized warrant
"is a particularly compelling example of good faith. A warrant is a judicial
mandate to an officer to conduct a search or make an arrest, and the officer
has a sworn duty to carry out its provisions. Accordingly, we believe that
there should be a rule which states that evidence obtained pursuant to and
within the scope of a warrant is prima facie the result of good faith on the
part of the officer seizing the evidence." Final Report 55 (1981).

~
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c
We co:pclude that the marginal or nonexiste
roduced by suppressing ev1 ence obtained in reasonable reliance on a subsequen y mvahdated searc warran cannot
ju~ra co ts-~hrsion.- s-eeante, at-=-==:
We do nofSUggest, liowever-;-that exclusion is always inappropriate in cases where an officer has obtained a warrant
and abided by its terms. "[S]earches pursuant to a warrant
will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness," Illinois v. Gates, supra, at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in the
judgment), for "a warrant issued by a magistrate normally
suffices to establish" that a law enforcement officer has
"acted in good faith in conducting the search." United
States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 823, n. 32 (1982). Neverthe- ~
less, the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause
determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant
he issues must be ob'e iv 1 re sonable, cf. Harlow v. fjhgf}!f!Jd, 457 U. . 800, 81&-819 (19 2), 22 and itTsCle ar that in
some circumstances the officer 23 will have no reasonable
grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued. r

t

7

22

.. ·

'•

In Harlow, we eliminated the subjective com anent of the ualified immunity pub1ic officia s enJOY m w s see ng damages for a eged eprtvatiofis of consfttubonal nghts. The situations are not perfectly analogous,
but we also eschew inquiries into the sub·ective beliefs of law enforce ent
o~ who seize eVl ence pursuant to a subsequently inva 1 ated warrant. Although we have suggested that "[o]n occasion, the motive with
which the officer conducts the illegal search may have some relevance in
determining the propriety of applying the exclusionary rule," Scott v.
United States, 436 U. S. 128, 139, n. 13 (1978), we believe that "[s]ending
state and federal courts into the minds of police officers would produce a
grave and fruitless mis-allocation of judicial resources." Massachusetts v.
Painten, 389 U. S. 560, 565 (1968) (WHITE, J ., dissenting). Accordingly,
our good-faith in ui is confined to the objective! ascertainable question
cer would have
own t a
e
wht!t er a !~ we -trame
searcfi waSffiel1"al desPite the magistrate's authOriZation. IilrrialGng tn?s
determma wn, all o tl:ie circumstances-me u mg whether the warrant
application had previously been rejected by a different magistrate-may be
considered.
Zl References to "officer" throughout this opinion should not be read too
narrowly. It is necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not
only of the officers who eventually executed a warrant, but also of the offi-

l.

l
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Sup ression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if
t e magistra e or JU ge in issumg a warrant was· misled by

informatiOn m an a avit tlla.t t e affiant knew was false or
would have known was false except for his reckless disregard
of the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 (1978).
The exception we recognize today will also not apply in cases
where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial
role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New
York, 442 U. S. 319 (1979); in such circumstances, no reasonably well-trained officer should rely on the warrant.
Nor
would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a
warrant based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable." Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 610-611 (PowELL, J., concurring in part); see Illinois v. Gates, supra, at
--== (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment). Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient-i. e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seizedthat the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to
be valid. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, post, at--.
In so limiting the suppression remedy, we leave untouched
the probable cause standard and the various requirements for
a valid warrant. Other objections to the modification of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule we consider to be insubstantial. The good-faith exception for searches conducted pursuant to warrants is not intended to signal our unwillingness strictly to enforce the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, and we do not believe that it will have this effect. As we have already suggested, the good-faith exception, turning as it does on objective reasonableness, should
not be difficult to apply in practice. Even in the case of warcers who originally obtained it or who provided information material to the
probable-cause determination. Nothing in our opinion suggests, for example, that an officer could obtain a warrant on the basis of a "bare bones"
affidavit and then rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances
under which the warrant was obtained to conduct the search. Whitely v.
Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 568 (1971).

l
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rantless searches, which are not before us today, a good-faith
exception "should be no more difficult to apply than the
closely related good-faith test which governs civil suits under
42 U. S. C. § 1983." Illinois v. Gates, supra, at - (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, at 815-819. When officers have acted pursuant to a warrant, the prosecution should ordinarily be able to
establish objective good faith without a substantial expenditure of judicial time.
Nor are we persuaded that application of a good-faith exception to searches conducted pursuant to warrants will preclude review of the constitutionality of the search or seizure,
deny needed guidance from the courts, or freeze Fourth
Amendment law in its present state. 24 There is no need for
courts to adopt the inflexible practice of always deciding
whether the officers' conduct manifested objective good faith
before turning to the question whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated. Defendants seeking suppression of
the fruits of allegedly unconstitutional searches or seizures
undoubtedly raise live controversies which Article III empowers federal courts to adjudicate. As cases addressing
questions of good-faith immunity under 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
compare O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975), with
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 566, n. 14 (1978), and
cases involving the harmless-error doctrine, compare Milton
v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371, 372 (1972), with Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970), make clear, courts have considerable discretion in conforming their decision-making processes to the exigencies of particular cases.
24
The argument that defendants will lose their incentive to litigate meritorious Fourth Amendment claims as a result of the good-faith exception
we adopt today is unpersuasive. Although the exception might discourage
presentation of insubstantial suppression motions, the magnitude of the
benefit conferred on defendants by a successful motion makes it unlikely
that litigation of colorable claims will be substantially diminished.
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If the resolution of a particular Fourth Amendment ques. tion is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement
officers and magistrates, nothing will prevent reviewing
courts from deciding that question before turning to the
good-faith issue. 25 Indeed, it frequently will be difficult to
determine whether the officers acted reasonably without resolving the Fourth Amendment issue. Even if the Fourth
Amendment question is not one of broad import, reviewing
courts could decide in particular cases that magistrates under
their supervision need to be informed of their errors and so
evaluate the officers' good faith only after finding a violation.
In other circumstances, those courts could reject suppression
motions posing no important Fourth Amendment questions
by turning immediately to a consideration of the officers'
good faith. We have no reason to believe that our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence would suffer by allowing reviewing courts to exercise an informed discretion in making this
choice.
IV

When the principles we have enunciated today are applied
to the facts of this case, it is apparent that the judgment of
the Court of Appeals cannot stand. The Court of Appeals
applied the prevailing legal standards to Officer Rombach's
warrant application and concluded that the application could
not support the magistrate's probable-cause determination.
In so doing, the court clearly informed the magistrate that he
had erred in issuing the challenged warrant. This aspect of
the court's judgment is not under attack in this proceeding.
25
It has been suggested, in fact, that "the recognition of a 'penumbral
zone,' within which an inadvertant mistake would not call for exclusion,
. . . will make it less tempting for judges to bend fourth amendment standards to avoid releasing a possibly dangerous criminal because of a minor
and unintentional miscalculation by the police." Schroeder, supra note 13,
at 1420-1421 (footnote omitted); see Ashdown, Good Faith, the Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule-Oriented Adjudication in the Criminal Process, 24
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 335, 383-384 (1983).
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Having determined that the warrant should not have issued, the Court of Appeals understandably declined to adopt
a modification of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
that this Court had not previously sanctioned. Although the
modification finds strong support in our previous cases, the
Court of Appeals' commendable self-restraint is not to be
criticized. We have now re-examined the purposes of the
exclusionary rule and the propriety of its application in cases
where officers have relied on a subsequently invalidated
search warrant. Our conclusion is that the rule's purposes
will only rarely be served by applying it in such
circumstances.
In the absence of an allegation that the rna ·strate abandoned his c1etache an neutral role, suppression is apm:ppriat~ iftlie officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing
their affidavit ~r c~uld not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief 1n the existence of probable cause. Only respondent Leon has contended that no reasonably well-trained
police officer could have believed that there existed probable
cause to search his house; significantly, the other respondents advance no comparable argument. Officer Rombach's
application clearly was supported by much more than a "bare
bones" affidavit. The affidavit related the results of an extensive investigation and, as the opinions of the divided panel
of the Court of Appeals make clear, provided evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause. Under
these circumstances, the officers could reasonably rely on the
magistrate's determination of probable cause, and application
of the extreme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
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MEMORANDUM

To: Justice Powell
From: Rob
Date: February 24, 1984
Re: Justice White's proposed opinion in Leon

On the whole I think Justice White has done an admirable job
with a very difficult subject.

Naturally, I have a few comments:

--Throughout the opinion, he cites his own concurring and
dissenting opinions in prior cases.

Many times, those opinions

are the only authority available for the proposition he is trying
to support.

On other occasions, however, majority opinions of

the Court provide support as well and he does not cite to those
opinions.

I think the draft would be stronger if he relied on

authority other than himself, but that is not the sort of thing
you can suggest to another Justice, I suppose.

(While reading

the opinion, I sometimes got the feeling that Justice White was
saying "I told you so.")

/

~~ -

--In a more substantive vien, I am sure you have noted that his
verbalization of the "good faith" standard does not include "good
faith."

He has defined the test as one of "objective

........._____.

reasonableness."

His reasons for rejecting a subjective

component in the test are contained in footnotes 20 and 22.
Apparently, Justice White's concept of objective reasonableness
reaches most of the situations that a "good faith" standard would
reach.

It avoids, however, the dilemma that a court 'faces when

there are two identical violations of the "grey area" of the 4th
Amendment with one police officer subjectively believing his
conduct is okay, and the other believing his conduct is not.
Justice White would examine both violations to see if they are
objectively reasonable.

This approach has obvious good and bad

points, but I think the good probably outweigh the bad.
Although the ALI test that we discussed still seems
preferable to Justice White's, in practice it probably won't make
any difference.

On the surface, Justice White's test seems to

provide a narrower exception to the exclusionary rule than a
totality of the circumstances type test.

T'

"'nspect, however,

that in those cases where the TC determines (on his own totality
of the circumstances scale) that evidence should be admitted, he
will find the police conduct objectively reasonable and that
finding will probably withstand appellate scrutiny.

--I don't think the 2d sentence on page 23 makes sense.

How can

a police officer know in all situations whether the magistrate is
performing his job properly?

~

__________ -

______

--I think the 2d paragraph..._ of footnote 18 is very important and
should be included in ____,
the text.

--Also it might be nice to add a footnote that says something
like: "If our holding in this case leads to widespread abuse by
police departments, we'll go back to the old system."
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Dear Byron:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

;frt ·
T.M.

Justice White
cc:

The Conference

February 25 , 1984
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Deat Rvron:
Tn a ~~parate note, T. have ioinPd your opin3on.
write to say, first, that it is excellent and wil.l be a
landmark ~ecision.

I

I 1ikP. vour ~tandarrl of "obiectively reasonable"
(or "objectivP reasonab1~n~ss"), as it nvoi~s thP prob1~m
von """~ T sought to rectify i.n roy opjnion in Harlow.

is an arPa in hich 1 have had more than a
little interec.;t since I read Dallin Oaks' Chicaqo Law Review
article (that you citP) mv firRt Term here. You may recall
that I addressed the utiU ty of the exclusionary rule in my
concurrinq ooinion in Buetamonte . S~e partirularly 417 u.s.
283, at pp . 2Eil-271. Perhaps you would be wil.ling to ado a
citation to qustamont~ at qome aooropriate nlacP.
~hi~

I no have a couPle of relAtively minor suggesIn note 18, p. 18, I would omit the thirn ~ent~mr.e
~eqinninq:
"To the extent • • • " This sentPnce mav stimuJatf' suspicion that WI?!!!.!!. shifting responsibility . T.he
-1-conrt Paragraph in n. 18 is imnortant. Din yon consic'ler
jncl.uding it in the text rather than subordinating it to a
footnote? On p. 22, I would omit the second sentence in the
first paraqraph . tf I understand it correctly, what is says

tions .

is obvi.ous.
,;;

In sum, I thlnk vour opinion in T.~eon is particularly constructive . I believe that John - and possibly othPrs who ~issent from Leon - will aqree with us in Sheppar~ in which probable cause existed and a judge used the wrona
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-1771

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ALBERTO
ANTONIO LEON ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[February -

, 1984]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to
bar the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. To resolve this question, we must consider once again the tension
between the sometimes competing goals of, on the one hand,
deterring official misconduct and removing inducements to
unreasonable invasions of privacy and, on the other, establishing procedures under which criminal defendants are "acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth. " Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S.
165, 175 (1969).
JUSTICE WHITE

I

In August 1981, a confidential informant of unproven reliability informed an officer of the Burbank Police Department
that two persons known to him as "Armando" and "Patsy"
were selling large quantities of cocaine and methaqualone
from their residence at 620 Price Drive in Burbank, Cal.
The informant also indicated that he had witnessed a sale of
methaqualone by "Patsy" at the residence approximately five
months earlier and had observed at that time a shoebox containing a large amount of cash that belonged to "Patsy." He
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further declared that "Armando" and "Patsy" generally kept
only small quantities of drugs at their residence and stored
the remainder at another location in Burbank.
On the basis of this information, the Burbank police initiated an extensive investigation focusing first on the Price
Drive residence and later on two other residences as well.
Cars parked at the Price Drive residence were determined to
belong to respondents Armando Sanchez, who had previously
been arrested for possession of marihuana, and Patsy Stewart, who had no criminal record. During the course of the
investigation, officers observed an automobile belonging to
respondent Ricardo Del Castillo, who had previously been arrested for possession of 50 pounds of marihuana, arrive at the
Price Drive residence. The driver of that car entered the
house, exited shortly thereafter carrying a small paper sack,
and drove away. A check of Del Castillo's probation records
led the officers to respondent Alberto Leon, whose telephone
number Del Castillo had listed as his employer's. Leon had
been arrested in 1980 on drug charges and a companion had
informed the police at that time that Leon was heavily involved in the importation of drugs into this country. Before
the current investigation began, the Burbank officers had
learned that an informant had told a Glendale police officer
that Leon stored a large quantity of methaqualone at his residence in Glendale. During the course of this investigation,
the Burbank officers learned that Leon was living at 716
South Sunset Canyon in Burbank.
Subsequently, the officers observed several persons, at
least one of whom had prior drug involvement, arriving at
the Price Drive residence and leaving with small packages;
observed a variety of other material activity at the two residences as well as at a condominium at 7902 Via Magdalena;
and witnessed a variety of relevant activity involving respondents' automobiles. The officers also observed respondents Sanchez and Stewart board separate flights for Miami.
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The pair later returned to Los Angeles together, consented
to a search of their luggage that revealed only a small amount
of marihuana, and left the airport. Based on these and other
observations summarized in the affidavit, App. 34, Officer
Cyril Rombach of the Burbank Police Department, an experienced and well-trained narcotics investigator, prepared an
application for a warrant to search 620 Price Drive, 716 South
Sunset Canyon, 7902 Via Magdalena, and automobiles registered to each of the respondents for an extensive list of items
believed to be related to respondents' drug-trafficking activities. Officer Rombach's extensive application was reviewed
by several Deputy District Attorneys.
A facially valid search warrant was issued in September
1981 by a state superior court judge. The ensuing searches
produced large quantities of drugs at the Via Magdalena and
Sunset Canyon addresses and a small quantity at the Price
Drive residence. Other evidence was discovered at each of
the residences and in Stewart's and Del Castillo's automobiles. Respondents were indicted by a grand jury in the District Court for the Central District of California and charged
with consJ?iracy to possess and distribute cocaine and a variety of su~antive counts.
The ref'pondents then filed motions to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. 1 The District Court
held an evidentiary hearing and, while recognizing that the
1
Respondent Leon moved to suppress the evidence found on his person
at the time of his arrest and the evidence seized from his residence at 716
South Sunset Canyon. Respondent Stewart's motion covered the fruits of
searches of her residence at 620 Price Drive and the condominium at 7902
Via Magdalena and statements she made during the search of her residence. Respondent Sanchez sought to suppress the evidence discovered
during the search of his residence at 620 Price Drive and statements he
made shortly thereafter. He also joined Stewart's motion to suppress evidence seized from the condominium. Respondent Del Castillo apparently
sought to suppress all of the evidence seized in the searches. App. 78-80.
The respondents also moved to suppress evidence seized in the searches of
their automobiles.
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case was a close one, see App. 131, granted the motions to
suppress in part. It concluded that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause, 2 but did not suppress all of
the evidence as to all of the respondents because none of the
respondents had standing to challenge all of the searches. 3
In response to a request from the Government, the court
made clear that Officer Rombach had acted in good faith, but
it rejected the Government's suggestion that the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule should not apply where evidence is seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search
warrant. 4
2

"I just cannot find this warrant sufficient for a showing of probable
cause.
There is no question of the reliability and credibility of the informant as
not being established.
Some details given tended to corroborate, maybe, the reliability of [the
informant's] information about the previous transaction, but if it is not a
stale transaction, it comes awfully close to it; and all the other material I
think is as consistent with innocence as it is with guilt.
So I just do not think this affidavit can withstand the test. I find, then,
that there is no probable cause in this case for the issuance of the search
warrant.... " App. 127.
s The District Court concluded that Sanchez and Stewart had standing to
challenge the search of 620 Price Drive; that Leon had standing to contest
the legality of the search of 716 South Sunset Canyon; that none of the respondents had established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the condominium at 7902 Via Magdalena; and that Stewart and Del Castillo each had
standing to challenge the searches of their automobiles. The Government
indicated that it did not intend to introduce evidence seized from the other
respondents' vehicles. App. 127-129. Finally, the court suppressed
statements given by Sanchez and Stewart. Id., at 129-130.
'"On the issue of good faith, obviously that is not the law of the Circuit,
and I am not going to apply that law.
I will say certainly in my view, there is not any question about good
faith. [Officer Rombach] went to a Superior Court judge and got a warrant; obviously laid a meticulous trail. Had surveilled for a long period of
time, and I believe his testimony-and I think he said he consulted with
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The District Court denied the Government's motion for reconsideration, App. 147, and a divided panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It first concluded
that Officer Rombach's affidavit could not establish probable
cause to search the Price Drive residence. To the extent
that the affidavit set forth facts demonstrating the basis of
the informant's knowledge of criminal activity, the information included was fatally stale. The affidavit, moreover,
failed to establish the informant's credibility. Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals concluded that the information provided
by the informant was inadequate under both prongs of the
two-part test established in Aguilar v. Texas, 375 U. S. 108
(1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). 5
The officers' independent investigation neither cured the
staleness nor corroborated the details of the informant's declarations. The Court of Appeals then considered whether
the affidavit formed a proper basis for the search of the Sunset Canyon residence. In its view, the affidavit included no
facts indicating the basis for the informants' statements concerning respondent Leon's criminal activities and was devoid
of information establishing the informants' reliability. Because these deficiencies had not been cured by the police investigation, the District Court properly suppressed the fruits
of the search. The Court of Appeals refused the Government's invitation to recognize a good-faith exception to the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Pet. for Cert. 4a.
The Government's petition for certiorari expressly declined to seek review of the lower courts' determinations that
the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause and
three Deputy District Attorneys before proceeding himself, and I certainly
have no doubt about the fact that that is true." App. 140.
5
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. (1983), decided last Term, the
Court abandoned the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for determining
whether an informant's tip suffices to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant and substituted in its place a "totality of the circumstances" approach.
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presented only the question "[w]hether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the
admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective." We granted certiorari to consider the propriety of
such a modification. - - U. S. - - (1983). Although it
undoubtedly is within our power to consider the question
whether probable cause existed under the "totality of the circumstances" test announced last Term in Illinois v. Gates,
462 U. S. - - (1983), that question has not been briefed or
argued; and it is also within our authority, which we choose
to exercise, to take the case as it comes to us, accepting the
Court of Appeals' conclusion that probable cause was lacking
under the prevailing legal standards. See This Court's Rule
21.1(a).
We have concluded that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule can be modified somewhat without jeopardizing its
ability to perform its intended functions. Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II

Language in opinions of this Court and of individual Justices has sometimes implied that the exclusionary rule is a
necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 651, 65fH>57 (1961) (plurality opinion);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 462-463 (1928), or
that the rule is required by the conjunction of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. Mapp v. Ohio, supra, at 661-662
(Black, J., concurring); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S.
20, 33-34 (1925). These implications need not detain us long.
The Fifth Amendment theory has not withstood critical analysis or the test of time, see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S.
463 (1976), and the Fourth Amendment "has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons." Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (1976).
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A

The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly
precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its
commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes
makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or
seizure "work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong."
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 354 (1974). The
wrong condemned by the Amendment is "fully accomplished"
by the unlawful search or seizure itself, ibid., and the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to "cure the invasion
of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered."
Stone v. Powell, supra, at 540 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
The rule thus operates as "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the person aggrieved." United States v.
Calandra, supra, at 348.
Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case, our decisions make clear, is "an
issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct." Illinois v. Gates, supra, at--.
Only the former question is currently before us, and it must
be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing
the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that ultimately is found to be defective.
The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary
rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have
long been a source of concern. "Our cases have consistently
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of Judge and
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jury." United States v. Payner, 447 U. S. 727, 734 (1980).
An objectionable collateral consequence of this interference
with the criminal justice system's truth-finding function is
that some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced
sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains. 6 ParticuResearchers have only recently begun to study extensively the effects
of the exclusionary rule on the disposition of felony arrests. One study
suggests that the rule results in the nonprosecution or nonconviction of between 0.6% and 2.35% of individuals arrested for felonies. Davies, A
Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs"
of the Exclusionary Rule: The NLJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 A. B. F. Res. J. 611, 621 (forthcoming). The estimates are
higher for particular crimes the prosecution of which depends heavily on
physical evidence. Thus, the cumulative loss due to nonprosecution or
nonconviction of individuals arrested on felony drug charges is probably in
the range of2.8% to 7.1%. !d., at 680. Davies' analysis of California data
suggests that screening by police and prosecutors results in the release because of illegal searches or seizures of as many as 1.4% of all felony arrestees, id., at 650, that 0. 9% offelony arrestees are released because of illegal
searches or seizures at the preliminary hearing or after trial, id., at 653,
and that roughly 0.5% of all felony arrestees benefit from reversals on appeal because of illegal searches. I d., at 654. See also K. Brosi, A CrossCity Comparison of Felony Case Processing 16, 1&-19 (1979); Report of the
Comptroller General of the United States, Impact of the Exclusionary
Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions 10-11, 14 (1979); F. Feeney, F . Dill
& A. Weir, Arrests Without Convictions: How Often They Occur and Why
20~206 (1983); National Institute of Justice, The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in California 1-2 (1982); Nardulli, The Societal Cost of
the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 A. B. F. Res. J.
585, 600 (forthcoming). The exclusionary rule also has been found to affect the plea-bargaining process. S. Schlesinger, Exclusionary Injustice:
The Problem of Illegally Obtained Evidence 63 (1977). But see Davies,
supra, at 66&-669; Nardulli, supra, at 604-606.
Many of these researchers have concluded that the impact of the exclusionary rule is insubstantial, but the small percentages with which they
deal mask a large absolute number of felons who are released because the
cases against them were based in part on illegal searches or seizures.
"[A]ny rule of evidence that denies the jury access to clearly probative and
reliable evidence must bear a heavy burden of justification, and must be
carefully limited to the circumstances in which it will pay its way by deterring official unlawlessness." ~llinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. - - , - - (1983)
6
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larly when law enforcement officers have acted in good faith
or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of
the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic
concepts of the criminal justice system. Stone v. Powell,
supra, at 490. Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary
rule, therefore, may well "generat[e] disrespect for the law
and the administration of justice." !d., at 491. Accordingly, "[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the
rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." United
States v. Calandra, supra, at 348; see Stone v. Powell,
supra, at 486-487; United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 447
(1976).

B
Close attention to those remedial objectives has characterized our recent decisions concerning the scope of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule. The Court has, to be sure,
not seriously questioned, "in the absence of a more efficacious
sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress evidence from the [prosecution's] case where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate . . . . "
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171 (1978); Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492. Nevertheless, the balancing approach
that has evolved in various contexts-including criminal trials-"forcefully suggest[s] that the exclusionary rule be more
generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment." Illinois
v. Gates, supra, at - - (WHITE, J., concurring in the
judgment).
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), the Court emphasized the costs of the exclusionary rule, expressed its view
(WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment). Because we find that the rule
can have no substantial deterrent effect in the sorts of situations under consideration in this case, see post, a t -, we conclude that it cannot pay its
way in those situations.
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that limiting the circumstances under which Fourth Amendment claims could be raised in federal habeas corpus proceedings would not reduce the rule's deterrent effect, id., at
489-495, and held that a state prisoner who has been afforded
a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment
claim may not obtain federal habeas relief on the ground that
unlawfully obtained evidence had been introduced at his trial.
Cf. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 560-563 (1979). Proposed extensions of the exclusionary rule to proceedings
other than the criminal trial itself have been evaluated and
rejected under the same analytic approach. In United
States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), for example, we declined to allow grand jury witnesses to refuse to answer questions based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search or
seizure since "[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might
be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings
is uncertain at best." I d., at 348. Similarly, in United
States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), we permitted the use in
federal civil proceedings of evidence illegally seized by state
officials since the likelihood of deterring police misconduct
through such an extension of the exclusionary rule was insufficient to outweigh its substantial social costs. In so doing,
we declared that, "[i]f . . . the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted." !d., at 454.
As cases considering the use of unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal trials themselves make clear, it does not follow from the emphasis on the exclusionary rule's deterrent
value that "anything which deters illegal searches is thereby
commanded by the Fourth Amendment." Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S., at 174. In determining whether
persons aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence unlawfully obtained from their co-conspirators or codefendants could seek suppression, for example, we found
that the additional benefits of such an extension of the exclusionary rule would not outweigh its costs. !d., at 174-175.
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Standing to invoke the rule has thus been limited to cases in
which the prosecution seeks to use the fruits of an illegal
search or seizure against the victim of police misconduct.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 (1978); Brown v. United
States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963). Cf. United States v. Payner, 447
u. s. 727 (1980).
Even defendants with standing to challenge the introduction in their criminal trials of unlawfully obtained evidence
cannot prevent every conceivable use of such evidence. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief may be used to
impeach a defendant's direct testimony. Walder v. United
States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). See also Oregon v. Hass, 420
U. S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971).
A similar assessment of the "incremental furthering" of the
ends of the exclusionary rule led us to conclude in United
States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 627 (1980), that evidence inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief or otherwise as
substantive evidence of guilt may be used to impeach statements made by a defendant in response to "proper crossexamination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct
examination." Id., at 627-628.
When considering the use of evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment in the prosecution's case-in-chief,
moreover, we have declined to adopt a per se or but for rule
that would render inadmissible any evidence that came to
light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal
arrest. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun
v. United States, supra, at 487-488. We also have held that
a witness' testimony may be admitted even when his identity
was discovered in an unconstitutional search. United States
v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 (1978). The perception underlying these decisions-that the connection between police misconduct and evidence of crime may be sufficiently attenuated
to permit the use of that evidence at trial-is a product of
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considerations relating to the exclusionary rule and the constitutional principles it is designed to protect. Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U. S. 200, 217-218 (1979); United States v.
Ceccolini, supra, at 279. 7 In short, the "dissipation of the
taint" concept that the Court has applied in deciding whether
exclusion is appropriate in a particular case "attempts to
mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost."
Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 609 (POWELL, J., concurring in
part). Not surprisingly in view of this purpose, an assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an
important step in the calculus. Dunaway v. New York,
supra, at 218; Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 603-604.
The same attention to the purposes underlying the exclusionary rule also has characterized decisions not involving the
scope of the rule itself. We have not required suppression of
the fruits of a search incident to an arrest made in good-faith
reliance on a substantive criminal statute that subsequently
is declared unconstitutional. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U. S. 31 (1979). 8 Similarly, although the Court has been un"Brown's focus on 'the causal connection between the illegality and the
confession' . . . reflected the two policies behind the use of the exclusionary
rule to effectuate the Fourth Amendment. Where there is a close causal
connection between the illegal seizure and the confession, not only is exclusion of evidence more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the future, but use of the evidence is more likely to compromise the integrity of
the courts." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 217-218 (1979) (citation omitted).
8
We have held, however, that the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence obtained in searches carried out pursuant to statutes, not
yet declared unconstitutional, purporting to authorize searches and seizures without probable cause or search warrants. See, e. g., Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 (1979); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New
York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967).
"Those decisions involved statutes which, by their own terms, authorized
searches under circumstances which did not satisfy the traditional warrant
7
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willing to conclude that new Fourth Amendment principles
are always to have only prospective effect, United States v.
Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 560 (1982), 9 no Fourth Amendment
decision marking a "clear break with the past" has been applied retroactively. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S.
531 (1975); Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244 (1969);
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965). 10 The propriety
of retroactive application of a newly announced Fourth
Amendment principle, moreover, has been assessed largely
in terms of the contribution retroactivity might make to the
and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment." Michigan
v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, 39 (1979). The substantive Fourth Amendment principles announced in those cases are fully consistent with our holding here.
9
The Court held in United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537 (1982), that
a construction of the Fourth Amendment that did not constitute a "clear
break with the past" is to be applied to all convictions not yet final when
the decision was handed down. The limited holding, see id., at 562,
turned in part on the Court's judgment that "[f]ailure to accord any retroactive effect to Fourth Amendment rulings would 'encourage police or
other courts to disregard the plain purport of our decisions and to adopt a
let's-wait-until-it's-decided approach.'" I d., at 561 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 277 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting)). Contrary to respondents' assertions, nothing in Johnson precludes adoption of a good-faith exception tailored to situations in which the
police have reasonably relied on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral
magistrate but later found to be defective.
10
Our retroactivity decisions have, for the most part, turned on our assessments of "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the
extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards,
and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.'' Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 297 (1967).
As we observed earlier this Term,
"In considering the reliance factor, this Court's cases have looked primarily to whether law enforcement authorities and state courts have justifiably relied on a prior rule of law said to be different from that announced
by the decision whose retroactivity is at issue. Unjustified 'reliance' is no
bar to retroactivity. This inquiry is often phrased in terms of whether the
new decision was foreshadowed by earlier cases or was a 'clear break with
the past."' Solem v. Stumes, No. 81-2149, circulating draft at 7-8.
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deterrence of police misconduct. United States v. Johnson,
supra, at 560-561; United States v. Peltier, supra, at
536-539, 542.

As yet, we have not recognized any form of good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. 11 But
the balancing approach that has evolved during the years of
experience with the rule provides strong support for the
modification currently urged upon us. As we discuss below,
our evaluation of the costs and benefits of suppressing reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably ·relying
on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate
leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief.

III
A
Because a search warrant "provides the detached scrutiny
of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard
against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a
law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,"' United States v. Chadwick,
433 U. S. 1, 9 (1971) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333
U. S. 10, 14 (1948)), we have expressed a strong preference
for warrants and declared that "in a doubtful or marginal case
a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without
11

Members of the Court have, however, urged reconsideration of the
scope of the exclusionary rule. See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
496 (1976) (BURGER, C. J., concurring); id., at 536 (WHITE, J., dissenting);
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. - , - (1983) (WHITE, J., concurring in the
judgment); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 60~12 (1975) (POWELL, J.,
concurring in part); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 261-271
(1983) (POWELL, J., concurring); California v. Minjares, 443 U. S. 916
(1979) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from denial of stay). One Court of Appeals, no doubt influenced by these individual urgings, has adopted a form
of good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. United States v. Williams, 622 F. 2d 830 (CA5 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1127
(1981).

I
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one it would fail." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S.
102, 106 (1965). See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S., at 111.
Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question
whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and
we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is
most appropriately effectuated by according "great deference" to a magistrate's determination. Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U. S., at 419. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S., at
- - ; United States v. Ventresca, supra, at 108--109.
Deference to the magistrate, however, is not boundless.
It is clear, first, that the deference accorded to a magistrate's
finding of probable cause does not preclude inquiry into the
knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit on which that
determination was based. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S.
154 (1978). 12 Second, the courts must also insist that the
magistrate purport to "perform his 'neutral and detached'
function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police." Aguilar v. Texas, supra, at 111. See Illinois v.
Gates, supra, at--. A magistrate failing to "manifest that
neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer
when presented with a warrant application" and who acts instead as "an adjunct law enforcement officer" cannot provide
valid authorization for an otherwise unconstitutional search.
Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U. S. 319, 326--327 (1979).
Third, reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based
on an affidavit that does not "provide the magistrate with a
substantial basis for determining the existence of probable
cause." Illinois v. Gates, supra, at - - . "Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that
official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a
mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others." Ibid.
See Aguilar v. Texas, supra at 114-115; Giordenello v.
12

Indeed, "it would be an unthinkable imposition upon [the magistrate's]
authority if a warrant affidavit, revealed after the fact to contain a deliberately or recklessly false statement, were to stand beyond impeachment."
438 U.S., at 165.
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United States, 357 U. S. 480 (1958); Nathanson v. United
States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933). 13 Even if the warrant application
was supported by more than a "bare bones" arodavit, a reviewing court may properly conclude that, notwithstanding
the deference that magistrates deserve, the warrant was
invalid because the magistrate's probable-cause determination reflected an improper analysis of the totality of the circumstances, Illinois v. Gates, supra, at--, or because the
f<?rm of the warrant was improper in some respect.
Only in the first of these three situations, however, has the
Court set forth a rationale for suppressing evidence obtained
pursuant to a search warrant; in the other areas, it has simply excluded such evidence without considering whether
Fourth Amendment interests will be advanced. To the extent that proponents of exclusion rely on its behavioral effects on judges and magistrates in these areas, their reliance
is misplaced. First, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of
judges and magistrates. Second, there exists no evidence
suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore
or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness
13

See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964), in which the Court concluded that "the record ... does not contain a single objective fact to support a belief by the officers that the petitioner was engaged in criminal activity at the time they arrested him." !d., at 95. Although the Court was
willing to assume that the arresting officers acted in good faith, it concluded that
"'good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough.' Henry v.
United States, 361 U. S. 98, 102. If subjective good faith alone were the
test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the
people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only
in the discretion of the police." !d., at 97.
We adhere to this view and emphasize that nothing in this opinion is intended to suggest a lowering of the probable-cause standard. On the contrary, we deal here only with the remedy to be applied to a concededly unconstitutional search.
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among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion. 14
Third, and most important, we discern no basis, and are offered none, for believing that exclusion of evidence seized
pursuant to a warrant will have a signficant deterrent effect
on the issuing judge or magistrate. 15 Many of the factors
that indicate that the exclusionary rule cannot provide an effective "special" or "general" deterrent for individual offending law enforcement officers 16 apply as well to judges or mag14
Although there are assertions that some magistrates become rubber
stamps for the police and others may be unable effectively to screen police
conduct, see, e. g. , 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure§ 4.1 (1978); Kamisar,
Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis"
Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 Creighton L. Rev. 565,
569-571 (1983); Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 Geo. L. J. 1361, 1412 (1981), we
are not convinced that this is a problem of major proportions. See L. Tiffany, D. Mcintyre & D. Rotenberg, Detection of Crime 119 (1967); Israel,
Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren
Court, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1319, 1414, n. 396 (1977); P. Johnson, New Approaches to Enforcing the Fourth Amendment 8-10 (Working Paper, Sept.
1978), quoted in Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure 229-230 (5th ed. 1980); R. Van Duizend, L. Sutton & C. Carter, The
Search Warrant Process ch. 7 (Review Draft, 1983).
16
As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized in Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 506, - - N. E. 2d - - , - (1982):
"The exclusionary rule may not be well tailored to deterring judicial misconduct. If applied to judicial misconduct, the rule would be just as costly
as it is when it is applied to police misconduct, but it may be ill-fitted to the
job-created motivations of judges. . . .
[I]deally a judge is impartial as
to whether a particular piece of evidence is admitted or a particular defendant convicted. Hence, in the abstract, suppression of a particular piece of
evidence may not be as effective a disincentive to a neutral judge as it
would be to the police. It may be that a ruling by an appellate court that a
search warrant was unconstitutional would be sufficient to deter similar
misconduct in the future by magistrates."
But see United States v. Karanthanos, 531 F. 2d 26, 33-34 (CA2), cert.
denied, 428 U. S. 910 (1976).
6
' See, e. g. , Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465, 498 (1976) (BURGER, C. J .,
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istrates. And, to the extent that the rule is thought to
operate as a "systemic" deterrent on a wider audience, 17 it
clearly can have no such effect on individuals empowered to
issue search warrants. Judges and magistrates are not
adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal
prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them. Imposition of the exclusionary sanction is not necessary meaningfully to inform judicial officers of their errors, and we cannot conclude that
admitting evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant while at
the same time declaring that the warrant was somehow defective will in any way reduce judicial officers' professional
incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment, encourage
them to repeat their mistakes, or lead to the granting of all
colorable warrant requests. 18
B

If exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequently invalidated warrant is to have any deterrent effect,
therefore, it must alter the behavior of individual law enconcurring); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 709-710 (1970).
17
See, e. g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 221 (1979) (STEVENS,
J., concurring); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 Geo.
L. J. 365, 399-401 (1981).
18
Limiting the application of the exclusionary sanction may well increase
the care with which magistrates scrutinize warrant applications. We
doubt that magistrates are more desirous of avoiding the exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to warrants they have issued than of avoiding in\ vasions of privacy.
Federal magistrates, moreover, are subject to the direct supervision of
district courts. They may be removed for "incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability." 20 U. S. C. § 631(1). If a
magistrate serves merely as a "rubber stamp" for the police or is unable to
exercise mature judgment, closer supervision or removal provides a more
effective remedy than the exclusionary rule.

l
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forcement officers or the policies of their departments. One
could argue that applying the exclusionary rule in cases
where the police failed to demonstrate probable cause in the
warrant application deters future inadequate presentations
or "magistrate shopping" and thus promotes the ends of the
Fourth Amendment. Suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a technically defective warrant supported by probable
cause also might encourage officers to scrutinize more closely .
the form of the warrant and to point out suspected judicial ·
errors. We find such arguments speculative and conclude
that suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant
should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in
those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule. 19
We have frequently questioned whether the exclusionary
rule can have any deterrent effect when the offending officers
acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. "No empirical researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet been
able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a
deterrent effect .... " United States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at
452, n. 22. But even assuming that the rule effectively deters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the
law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and
should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.
As we observed in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 447
(1974), and reiterated in United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S.,
at 539:
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or
Our discussion of the deterrent effect of excluding evidence obtained in
reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated warrant assumes, of
course, that the officers properly executed the warrant and confined their
search to limits specified in the warrant.
19
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at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope
to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official conduct was pursued in complete good faith, however, the
deterrence rationale loses much of its force."
The Peltier Court continued, id., at 542:
"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly
be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment."
See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment); United States v. Janis, supra, at
459; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S., at 610-611 (PowELL, J.,
concurring in part). 20 In short, where the officer's conduct is
objectively reasonable,
We emphasize that the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an objective one. Many objections to a good-faith exception assume that the
exception will turn on the subjective good faith of individual officers.
"Grounding the modification in objective reasonableness, however, retains
the value of the exclusionary rule as an incentive for the law enforcement
profession as a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth
Amendment." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. - - , - - , n. 15 (1983)
(WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment); see Dunaway v. New York, 442
U. S. 200, 221 (1979) (STEVENS, J., concurring). The objective standard
we adopt, moreover, requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of
what the law prohibits. United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 542
(1975). As Professor Jerold Israel has observed:
"The key to the [exclusionary] rule's effectiveness as a deterrent lies, I believe, in the impetus it has provided to police training programs that make
officers aware of the limits imposed by the fourth amendment and emphasize the need to operate within those limits. [An objective good-faith exception] . . . is not likely to result in the elimination of such programs,
20
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"excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the
exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that . . . the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act under the circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect
his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to
do his duty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 539-540
(WHITE, J., dissenting).
This is particularly true, we believe, when an officer acting
with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from
a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope. 21 In most
such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter. It is the magistrate's responsibility to determine
whether the officer's allegations establish probable cause
and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary
case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that
the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. "[O]nce the
warrant issues, there is.literally nothing more the policeman
can do in seeking to comply with the law." Id., at 498 (BURwhich are now viewed as an important aspect of police professionalism.
Neither is it likely to alter the tenor of those programs; the possibility that
illegally obtained evidence may be admitted in borderline cases is unlikely
to encourage police instructors to pay less attention to fourth amendment
limitations. Finally, [it] ... should not encourage officers to pay less attention to what they are taught, as the requirement that the officer act in
'good faith' is inconsistent with closing one's mind to the possibility of illegality." Israel, supra note 14, at 1412-1413 (footnotes omitted).
21
According to the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime, the
situation in which an officer relies on a duly authorized warrant
"is a particularly compelling example of good faith. A warrant is a judicial
mandate to an officer to conduct a search or make an arrest, and the officer
has a sworn duty to carry out its provisions. Accordingly, we believe that
there should be a rule which states that evidence obtained pursuant to and
within the scope of a warrant is prima facie the result of good faith on the
part of the officer seizing the evidence." Final Report 55 (1981).
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GER, C. J., concurring). Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.

c
We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively rea- l
sonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion. See
ante, at--. We do not suggest, however, that exclusion is
always inappropriate in cases where an officer has obtained a
warrant and abided by its terms. "[S]earches pursuant to a
warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness," Illinois v. Gates, supra, at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment), for "a warrant issued by a magistrate
normally suffices to establish" that a law enforcement officer
has "acted in good faith in conducting the search." United
States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 823, n. 32 (1982). Nevertheless, the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause
determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant
he issues must be objectively reasonable, cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 815-819 (1982), 22 and it is clear that in
22
In Harlow , we eliminated the subjective component of the qualified immunity public officials enjoy in suits seeking damages for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights. The situations are not perfectly analogous ,
but we also eschew inquiries into the subjective beliefs of law enforcement
officers who seize evidence pursuant to a subsequently invalidated warrant. Although we have suggested that "[o]n occasion, the motive with
which the officer conducts the illegal search may have some relevance in
determining the propriety of applying the exclusionary rule," Scott v.
United States, 436 U. S. 128, 139, n. 13 (1978), we believe that "[s]ending
state and federal courts into the minds of police officers would produce a
grave and fruitless mis-allocation of judicial resources." Massachusetts v.
Painten, 389 U. S. 560, 565 (1968) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Accordingly,
our good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question
whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the
search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization. In making this
determination, all of the circumstances-including whether the warrant
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some circumstances the officer 23 will have no reasonable
grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued.
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if
the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by
information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or
would have known was false except for his reckless disregard
of the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 (1978).
The exception we recognize today will also not apply in cases
where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial
role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New
York, 442 U. S. 319 (1979); in such circumstances, no reasonably well-trained officer should rely on the warrant. Nor
would an officer manifest objectiv.e good faith in relying on a
warrant based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S., at 610-611
(POWELL, J., concurring in part); see Illinois v. Gates,
supra, at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment). Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case,
a warrant may be so facially deficient-i. e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seizedthat the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to
be valid. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, post, at--.
In so limiting the suppression remedy, we leave untouched
the probable-cause standard and the various requirements
for a valid warrant. Other objections to the modification of
application had previously been rejected by a different magistrate-may be
considered.
23
References to "officer" throughout this opinion should not be read too
narrowly. It is necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not
only of the officers who eventually executed a warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained it or who provided information material to the
probable-cause determination. Nothing in our opinion suggests, for example, that an officer could obtain a warrant on the basis of a "bare bones"
affidavit and then rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances
under which the warrant was obtained to conduct the search. See Whitely
v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 568 (1971).
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the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule we consider to be
insubstantial. The good-faith exception for searches conducted pursuant to warrants is not intended to signal our unwillingness strictly to enforce the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, and we do not believe that it will have this effect. As we have already suggested, the good-faith exception, turning as it does on objective reasonableness, should
not be difficult to apply in practice. Even in the case of warrantless searches, which are not before us today, a good-faith
exception "should be no more difficult to apply than the
closely related good-faith test which governs civil suits under
42 U. S. C. § 1983." Illinois v. Gates, supra, at - (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, at 815-819. When officers have acted pursuant to a warrant, the prosecution should ordinarily be able to
establish objective good faith without a substantial expenditure of judicial time.
Nor are we persuaded that application of a good-faith exception to searches conducted pursuant to warrants will preclude review of the constitutionality of the search or seizure,
deny needed guidance from the courts, or freeze Fourth
Amendment law in its present state. 24 There is no need for
courts to adopt the inflexible practice of always deciding
whether the officers' conduct manifested objective good faith
before turning to the question whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated. Defendants seeking suppression of
the fruits of allegedly unconstitutional searches or seizures
undoubtedly raise live controversies which Article III empowers federal courts to adjudicate. As cases addressing
questions of good-faith immunity under 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
24
The argument that defendants will lose their incentive to litigate meritorious Fourth Amendment claims as a result of the good-faith exception
we adopt today is unpersuasive. Although the exception might discourage
presentation of insubstantial suppression motions, the magnitude of the
benefit conferred on defendants by a successful motion makes it unlikely
that litigation of colorable claims will be substantially diminished.
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compare O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975), with
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 566, n. 14 (1978), and
cases involving the harmless-error doctrine, compare Milton
v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371, 372 (1972), with Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970), make clear, courts have considerable discretion in conforming their decision-making processes to the exigencies of particular cases.
If the resolution of a particular Fourth Amendment question is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement
officers and magistrates, nothing will prevent reviewing
courts from deciding that question before turning to the
good-faith issue. 25 Indeed, it frequently will be difficult to
determine whether the officers acted reasonably without resolving the Fourth Amendment issue. Even if the Fourth
Amendment question is not one of broad import, reviewing
courts could decide in particular cases that magistrates under
their supervision need to be informed of their errors and so
evaluate the officers' good faith only after finding a violation.
In other circumstances, those courts could reject suppression
motions posing no important Fourth Amendment questions
by turning immediately to a consideration of the officers'
good faith. We have no reason to believe that our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence would suffer by allowing reviewing courts to exercise an informed discretion in making this
choice.
IV
When the principles we have enunciated today are applied
to the facts of this case, it is apparent that the judgment of
the Court of Appeals cannot stand. The Court of Appeals
25
It has been suggested, in fact, that "the recognition of a 'penumbral
zone,' within which an inadvertant mistake would not call for exclusion,
... will make it less tempting for judges to bend fourth amendment standards to avoid releasing a possibly dangerous criminal because of a minor
and unintentional miscalculation by the police." Schroeder, supra note 14,
at 1420-1421 (footnote omitted); see Ashdown, Good Faith, the Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule-Oriented Adjudication in the Criminal Process, 24
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 335, 383-384 (1983).
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applied the prevailing legal standards to Officer Rombach's
warrant application and concluded that the application could
not support the magistrate's probable-cause determination.
In so doing, the court clearly informed the magistrate that he
had erred in issuing the challenged warrant. This aspect of
the court's judgment is not under attack in this proceeding.
Having determined that the warrant should not have issued, the Court of Appeals understandably declined to adopt
a modification of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
that this Court had not previously sanctioned. Although the
modification finds strong support in our previous cases, the
Court of Appeals' commendable self-restraint is not to be
criticized. We have now re-examined the purposes of the
exclusionary rule and the propriety of its application in cases
where officers have relied on a subsequently invalidated
search warrant. Our conclusion is that the rule's purposes
will only rarely be served by applying it in such
circumstances.
In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing
their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. Only respondent Leon has contended that no reasonably well-trained
police officer could have believed that there existed probable
cause to search his house; significantly, the other respondents advance no comparable argument. Officer Rombach's
application clearly was supported by much more than a "bare
bones" affidavit. The affidavit related the results of an extensive investigation and, as the opinions of the divided panel
of the Court of Appeals make clear, provided evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause. Under
these circumstances, the officers' reliance on the magistrate's
determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable,
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and application of the extreme sanction of exclusion is
inappropriate.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.
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Massachusetts v. Shepherd

Memo to Rob:
We granted three cases to address what has come to be
called a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.
The

two

cases

listed

above

argument week in January.

will

be

argued

the

second

The third case granted - and

briefed - is 82-1711, Colorado v. Quintero.

This has been

stricken from the argument list, as I understand it.

This

is regrettable, as only Quintero presents the good faith
question in its broadest sense.
Apparently the Clerk - perhaps with the CJ's approval
- has included 82-1845, Colorado v. Nunez, in the place of
Quintero.
~

~

DIG

I have read Nunez, and my guess is that we will

the case on

the ground

that

it was decided on an

adequate and independent state ground.
Accordingly, this memo will address only Shepherd and
Leon, and each very briefly.

Shepherd (Mass. case)
Of

course

the

-

SG

states

the question

in

Shepherd

rather wordedly, but helpfully:
"2.
In No. 82-963, the question presented
is whether the Fourth amendment exclusionary
rule should be modi f ie.d so as not to bar the
admission of e~idence seized in reasonable
reliance on a search warrant suppor!~d dby
probable sause but later held to be technicqlly
to
incorporate~
the
detective
tor
failure
specification of items to be seized contained in
the warrant application."

The

police,

clearly

had

residence
brutal

probable
where

murder

prepared

after

an

in

commendable

casuse

it
a

a

was

believed

basement

application

to

search

respondent's

he

commit ted

a

had

A police

room.

for

investigation,

search

a

officer

warrant

that

specified in some detail the items for which permission
for

search

was

sought.

See

SG's

brief

p.

11.

The

difficulty was that on a Sunday afernoon, no court clerk
could be found and the judge to whom the application was
delivered also had no search warrant form.

A form was

found normally used for searches for "control substances",
and

this

was

"marked

up".

The

form

identified

the

basement of the residence as the place to be searched, but
omitted

the

"items

listed

in

the

police

officer's

affidavit

in

support

affidavit attached."
whom

the

form

and

of

the

application,

nor

(p. 12, SG's brief).
application were

was

the

The judge to

submitted

-

though

recognizing that it was not the proper form - nevertheless
signed the search warrant.
Officers arrived at the residence with the warrant
and

the

affidavit.

They

were

admitted

to

house

by

respondent's mother and sister, neither of whom asked to
read

the

resulting

warrant.
in

the

The

search

discovery

of

was

highly

conclusive

fruitful,

evidence

of

respondent's guilt.

No one questions the good faith of

the police officers.

They had even consulted the district

attorney

with

respect

to

the

application,

understandably they relied on the judge.
agreed

that

the

warrant

was

"fatally

and

The trial court
defective",

but

concluded nevertheless that the exclusionary rule should
not be invoked because its deterrent effect would be zero.
The

Supreme

Judicial

Court

of

Massachusetts

reversed,

finding the warrant defective for its failure to list the
items specified in the affidavit.
Leon (CA9 case)
Th i s case ,

a sui t

in

fed e r a 1 co u r t

in Ca 1 i for n i a ,

involved charges of conspiring to possess and distribute

cocaine

and

various

other

contraband

The

drugs.

SG' s

brief in particular sets forth in detail the information
that

prompted

the

issuance

of

a

search

warrant.

The

police investigation was prompted by information obtained
from "a confidential informant of unproven reliability".
On

the

basis

instituted

a

of

this

month

long

'

tw=e

Burbank

information,
investigation

that

police

focused

on

~

residences, places and persons identified by the informer.
As

the SG' s

brief demonstrates

investigation
information

confirmed

that

in

initiated

(p.

3

-

significant

their

the pol ice

7) ,

detail

investigation.

One

the
of

the investigating officer, Rombach, supported his request
for a search warrant by his personal observation of the
places and persons under surveillance during the month of
Rombach

investigation.
officer"

with

was

"specialized

an

"experienced
training

in

narcotics
narcotics

investigations".
Based on information thus provided, a State Superior
Court Judge

issued a ,...,warrant
authorizing the search of
.....
w-

several residences and automobiles registered in the names
of

the

four

respondents.

In the searches based on the

warrants, officers seized a vast amount of drugs and drug
paraphenalia.

A

district

court

suppressed

all

of

the

seized

evidence, finding that the "reliability and creditability
of the informant had not been established".

The DC noted,

however, that there was no question about the "good faith"
of the officers who obtained the warrant.

Moreover, as

the DC noted,

Officer Rombach had consul ted with

Deputy

United

States

appeal,

CA9

(2

to

Attorneys

1)

before

affirmed

the

three

proceeding".

suppression

On

order.

Judge Kennedy dissented on the basis that the informant's
information

was

sufficiently

both

correct

surveillance.

adequately
in

view

corroborated
the

of

month

and
long

(pp. 8 and 9).

My Views
Subject

to

cases for me.

further

enlightenment,

these

are

easy

I would reverse both of them.

Reversal

would

opinion in Brown v.

be

consistent

Illinois,

422

with

u.s.

my

concurring

590, 610- 611.

Brown was a Fourth Amendment arrest case.

He had been

arrested without probable cause or a warrant. He was then
a....,/
given Miranda warnings, ~t thereafter made inculpatory
admissions.

The

question

were properly admitted or
Brown's murder

was

whether

these

statements

should have been excluded

trial under doctrine of Wong Sun.

in

This

Court reversed, concluding that the Miranda warnings were
not sufficient under Wong Sun to purge the taint of the
illegal arrest.
As I did not approve of the Court's rather broadly
written

opnion,

I

concurred

only

in

part,

and

drew

a

distinction between the types of police conduct that the
exlusionary rule is intended to deter.

After identifying

situations in which the rule should apply, I wrote:

I

"At the opposite end of the spectrum lie
"technical"
violations of
Fourth
amendment
rights where, for example, officers in good
faith arrest an individual in reliance on a
later invalidated or pursuant to a
at
subsequentl-is
declared
unconsti utiona , see Un1te States v. Kilgen,
445 -r .2a 287 (CAS 1971).
As we noted in
Michigan v.
Tucker,
supra,
at 447:
'The
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule
necessarily assumes that the police have engaged
in willful, or at the very least negligent,
conduct which has deprived the defendant of some
right.'
In cases in which this underlying
premise is lacking, the deterrence rationale of
the exclusionary rule does not obtain, and I can
see no legitimate justification for depriving
the prosecution of
reliable and probative
evidence."
The foregoing statement applies to both of the cases

we will hear in January.

*

*

*

It is regretable that Quintero was "scrubbed", as it
would

have

presented

the

pure

"good

faith"

issue

as

distinguished from the "defective warrant" issue where the
police have relied in good faith on such a warrant.

In

Quintero the question was whether the exclusionary rule
should

be modified

evidence

seized

so as

in

not

the

to bar

reasonable

the admission of
belief

that

the

warrantless arrest of a burglar suspect did not violate
the

Fourth

Amendment.

The

Attorney

General's

brief,

written before Quintero was scrubbed, argues primarily for
this type of a broad exception to the rule.

I would find

this a considerably more difficult question, and would not
address it in these two cases.

*

*

*

Note to Rob:
There are a dozen amici briefs, and all one need do
is

identify

the

source

of

the

brief

reasonable certainty its position.
any

of

them

will

shed

any

light

to

predict

I doubt the reading of
on

this

case

otherwise is fully briefed.
Discuss with me whether to do a bench memo.
LFP, JR.

with

which
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From: Rob Couch

Date: January 9, 1984

~

~A- ~ ..

~~1~
C~: ~~~~- p~
Re: United States v. Leon,

~~

5'~ v ;?~ ~ ~ Question

./)..~U-~ ~UA--~k_
Should

there

be

a

"good

faith

VL-

Presented /'2e;_~.,..__/;-J ~

except ion"

to

the

exclusionary

rule?

1?;~1-?,_; ~ ~ ~·~

The threshold question in this case is whether the Constitution permits

the use of evidence that has been gathered

unconstitutional fashion.

Put another way:

rule derived from the 4th Amendment?

in an

Is the exclusionary

-

Of course, resps (and Jus-

tice Stewart in his Stone lecture) would answer "yes," relying on
language in Mapp v.

Ohio,

367

u.s.

643,

656-657

(1961).

(Resp

Sanchez maintains that the 5th Amendment also requires suppression of illegally seized evidence.)
jected this notion,

u.s.

however,

The Court seems to have re-

in United States v.

Calandra,

338, 348 (1974):
"In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deter rent ef feet, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved.
Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the

414

use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or
ag a-lnS€ a IT persons. - As w"'i"fh any remedial device, the
application of the rule has been restricted to those
areas where its remedial objectives are thought most
efficaciously served."
See also Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 465, 486 (1976}.
Thus, the Constitution does not require the exclusion of all
tainted evidence.

What evidence should be excluded then?

Appar-

ently, all evidence that will deter governmental misconduct.

You

seized on the deterrence rational in your concurrence in Brown v.
Illinois, 422 v. 590, 612 (1975}:
"'The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful,
or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.' In cases in which
this underlying premise is lacking, the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule does not obtain, and I
can see no legitimate justification for depriving the
prosecution of reliable and probative evidence."
~~

Your language quoted above and the language used in other cases
seems to suggest that the misconduct that is to be deterred is
that of the police.

~m

~ ter

See also Stone, at 487.

aware of states that the exclusionary rule is intended to deonly police misdeed •

~V~ Illinois v. Gates, 103 s.ct.
~~xclusionary rule was adopted
~ li~ not to punish the errors
f; fJ. tJ
f~
~

in
2317,

2345

(1983}, stated:

"fT]he

to deter unlawful searches by poof magistrates and judges.

Magis-

trates must be neutral and detached from law enforcement opera-

~ tions
~

But no case that I

and I would not presume that a modification of the exclu-

sionary

rule

will

lead

magistrates

reponsibili ty to apply the law."

to

abdicate

their

Justice Stewart's response to

this argument in the Stone lectures was that the Framers could

y::-5~L ~ ~ t>fo ~ ~~k_
t/- L). ~ ~ l/ll t:Z,~ •
t.

/j IW

not have intended the Constitution to operate under some sort of
honor system.

83 Colum. L. Rev., at 1383-1384.

I think the correct response is somewhere in between.
behaving magistrate can cause just as much,

A mis-

and perhaps more,

damage to the 4th Amendment as an errant police officer.

The

contention that the exclusionary rule is unnecessary because a
magistrate is bound by law not to violate the Constitution is
unconvincing; a police officer is under the same constraints.

If

~

.

. . ......'

the exclusionary rule is not as appropriate in cases involving

l.1.. ~

-~

.'ltU-"'~,

the misdeeds of a magistrate, the reason should be that exclus ~fi~~
will not have a sufficient deterrent effect on the magistrate's
behavior to justify
criminal.

th ~

corresponding costs,

i.e., freeing the

(This line of reasoning, of course, is just a restate-

ment of your concurrence in Brown.)

The reason that the exclu-

sionary rule deters police from misbehaving is that it deprives
them of any incentive to violate a defendant's of his constitu-

---

tional rights.

...

A policeman's job performance is judged by the

number of crimes he solves.

There is, therefore, a strong incen-

tive for him to be over-zealous in fereting out evidence of a
crime.

By the same token, if a court-imposed exclusionary rule

deprives him of the evidence when he violates the Constitution,
~e ~ n

incentive not to be over-zealous.

~~~~~magistrate,

~i~e
~

to violate the Constitution.

His job and future promo-

tions do not depend on the number of warrants he issues.

~, no

; ested

~ at

.vi~

"'-----

on the other hand, does not have the same in-

inte ~ ng

trial:

that

~~ ence

is, or is

He has

no~dmit

To be eligible to hear a case he must be neutral

~

~ , -:---:pz;c~{;t:;"C/;;::;i::::::Q~ ~

and

7~~

V'
Shadwick

detached.

v.

City of Tampa,

407

He very well may be under some sort of

(1972).

u.s.

345,

350

psychologi~

compulsion to agree with the police officer who has submitte
warrant application,

~,

~

a

~

they may have become friends afters

years of all night sessions at the station house, but he is not
~
;I(
(Y"~,

...

under

any monetary or

institutional pressure to side with the

Ji_.....,

police.

As a result, any deterent effect of

exclusio~
....._--.

is mini....._,

Deterence is also reduced in situations such as the one in

,...,-.

Leon because the magistrate has not done anything wrong.

~-

There

are no allegations that the magistrate acted in bad faith.

,.-

Jl

He

,,

-

simply made a close call which was later determined to be wrong.
The exclusion of the evidence in this case may cause this partieular magistrate to be more careful in the future

(although the

lower court opinions in this case offer little advice for use in
future cases), I doubt that use of the exclusionary rule in this
(In fact, I rather
hope it would not.

If the same facts were to arise in a differ-

ent circuit, I am convinced that the reviewing court would find

2

~ pro~able

~~v.

cause, especially after the Court's admonitions in IlliGates last spring to give the magistrate's decision great

~; ference.)

~ ~n

~

addition,

it is worthwhile to point out that the exclu-

sionary rule exacts a unusually high toll in this context.

Once ~

the police have what they believe is a valid search warrant, they
premises.
successful and

renders

With any luck, the

relevant evidence,

which

leads

search is
to more

relevant evidence, eventually resulting in a conviction.

On ap-

peal, the reviewing court finds no probable cause for the initial
warrant.

Thus,

the evidence from the initial search is tainted

as is all resulting "fruit."

At that point, there is no way "to

put the toothpaste back into the tube."
feet,

immunized

and

the police are

The evidence is, in ef-

really worse off

then when

they started.
Finally,

if

the Court recognizes a good

faith exception to

the exclusionary rule in this case, it should have an effect on
only a small number of cases.

As pointed out in Gates, a review-

ing court gives

"great deference"

probable cause.

103 S.Ct., at 2331.

viewing

courts

to a magistrate's finding of
The Court stated that re-

should dispense with

elaborate specificity."

"technical

Id., at 2330.

requirements of

It seems to me that there

would be only a very few cases in which a magistrate has acted
uJ~

with good faith and whose finding will not pass muster under the

~ "great

deference"

standard.

It

is only in that rare case that

~~ the exception to the exclusionary rule
~hough the Court can expect much braying
r~
~-lA>

~

.ltvl
vy.-

would apply.

Thus,

al-

in the law reviews if it

adopts a ~~ on, in reality, it will not have much
~·

II

''

practical effect.

__....,.

,., • J

not

free

many

-

(Resps concede that the exclusionary rule does

criminal

defendants

in

its

present

~ ief, at 43-53; Sanchez Brief, at 60-64.)
~ ft.- So~ , I have carefully a~d the practical

~ill

attend

problem

involves

coming

up with

a workable

Leon

~
problems that

the creation of a good faith exception.
,,

standard.

form.

The first

formulation of

the

<l\

The standard should,

:;:::

I

think,

require subjective and

IV~/

objective good faith on the part of both the police and the mag-

----istrate.

=""

Police behavior is more easily measured against a "good

faith" standard than is the judgment of a magistrate, particularly in the probable cause context.
tion should be judged

a ~hether

Perhaps, the magistrate's ache acted in "total disregard of

the existence or non-existence of probable cause" or "flagrant

@;>

abuse of office." The state in Shepard suggests a totality of the
~~ circumstances

approach...L.. i.e.,

under

~ tanc~~ '

exclusion deter

future

fr

will

a

t~~ i.!;J

.. of

the

~cum

4th Amendment violations.

Such a test is in line with recent decisions dealing with other
aspects of the 4th Amendment, see Illinois v. Gates, but such a
flexible standard will undoubtedly lead to a plethora of litigation.

I suppose my point is that formulating the proper standard

would be a difficult task, but not insurmountable.
of the standard wi 11 also be a problem,

Application

but one to which the

courts are accustomed.

r~nother

legitimate concern of those who are opposed to a good

~ ~ faith exception is that it will lead to magistrate shopping.

Un-

( ~ ~doubtedly, the police can recognize a magistrate's tendency to be

~sympathetic
/JlM...

to their cause.

ping already takes place.

But I suspect that magistrate

As pointed out above, a magistrate's

finding of probable cause is only reversed in rare cases.
fore,

shop- ~
There-

if one magistrate is a push-over, the police are probably

already taking advantage of that fact.

Adoption of a good faith

exception would not create any additional incentive to magistrate
shop. 1

----,..----~ 'P ~,c .. ~ 1-o ~~~~~LT'"I~u
a.-. .. t

~

A:..f-~5~ ~~
Footnote (s) 1 will ~Pejr on fo~liowhg pages.

~~8' · ~.

p~'S
In my mind, the most serious drawback to the good faith exception is that it might result in a lackadaisical attitude among

--

magistrates.

As a practical matter, the magistrate's decision to

issue a warrant would be virtually unreviewable (unless he has no
grounds for finding probable cause).
centive to be careful.

Thus, there is little in-

It would be nice if the courts had some

equitable power to oversee the actions of

magistrates. 2

Anyway,

sloppiness in the ranks of the magistrates is a risk that the
good faith exception would entail.
In sum, this is a very difficult issue.

I think I would come

out in favor of recognizing a good faith exception--but a very
carefully tailored one.

If you disagree, and decide that evi-

1

oth~r-~~o~ms that the commentators foresee are:
1) gooa-Faitn exception would freeze development of 4th Amendment
law, i.e., courts would not reach constitutional issues if the
evidence-would not be exclude~nyway. I disagree. ~he ~roEer
analisis in a case would be t~et~ine whether a violat1on of
ther th . Amendment has occurred, an~hen decide what the remedy
should be if there has been a violation. Some courts might be
tempted to take a short-cut, but I think those courts that would
be on the cutting edge of any new developments would employ the
proper analysis.
2) good faith exception would encourage police11 ignorance of the
law. I disagree. If_ the exception includes an objective
component ~ there is no incentive for police not to keep abreast
~
o~.
If the "reasonable" police officer would know of a
~ legal development, ignorance of that development would lead to
~ exclusion.

~I
~

~

y•4

had the library run a Lexis search to see if any courts make

,~_ it a practice to discipline unruly magistrates.
Apparently,
t ere are statutes in several states that allow a court to find
~istrate in contempt or in violation of the law if he abuses

his office. See North Carolina v. Greer, 302 S.E. 2d 774 (N.C.
1983) ~ In re Pagliughi, 189 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1963). I could not
find a case in which a magistrate has been disciplined for
abusing his power to issue search warrants.

a

·/

~

dence should be excluded where the magistrate incorrectly finds
probable cause, you will have trouble justifying your inclination
to reverse in Shepard.

As you will recall, the problem in Shep-

ard was that the warrant failed,

through inadvertance, to list

with particularity the i terns to be sought in the search.
"probable cause" and

Both

"particularity" are mentioned

in the 4th

Amendment as necessary components of a valid warrant.

Thus, both

of

those concepts have constitutional dimensions.

It will be

difficult to explain why the absence of one calls for exclusion
of evidence, while the absence of the other does not.
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MEMORANDUM

To: Justice Powell

From: Rob

Date: January 17, 1984

Re: United States v. Leon

1.

In your

memo of

today you asked me

to give

some more

thought to a more precise verbalization of a "good faith" standard.

I have done so and have discussed my thoughts with Justice

Blackmun's and Justice O'Connor's law clerks.
My impression from your memo is that you would like a standard that applies equally to both police and magistrates.
know whether that is possible.
rationale for

As you point out, the deterrence

the exclusionary rule suggests that it should not

apply to magistrates
Magistrates

I don't

do

not

to the same degree as

have

as

much

incentive

it does to police.
to

violate

the

4th

Amendment; so deterrence is not as vital.
Second, an objective standard does not work as well with magistrates as it does with police.
will

be

argued

tomorrow,

it

For instance, in the cases that

is

unclear

reached using an objective standard.

•

what

result

would

be

In Sheppard, the magistrate

(actually a local judge} issued a warrant that failed to describe
the objects of the search with particularity.

Any "reasonable

magistrate" should know that the 4th Amendment requires that the
objects of the search be listed with particularity.

Thus, under

an objective standard, the evidence would be excluded.
the

magistrate

search.

that

A DJ disagreed.

with the DJ.
magistrate's
Under

determined

there

was

Two members of

probable

In Leon,
cause

to

the CA9 panel agreed

It would be conceptually difficult to assesss the
determination

Illinois v.

great deference.

Gates,

against

a

reasonableness

standard.

a magistrates decision must be given

If a DC or CA is willing to overrule a magis-

trate's finding of probable cause, wouldn't that mean that the

hf

magistrate's decision is ipso facto unreasonable.

ftJ+" Mt..ll- •

In short, a

standard that focuses on objective reasonableness is unsatisfactory.
The best standard ,that I can come up with that would apply to

-

both police and magistrates is that espoused by the American Law
I nstitute.

I\

II

a

-

The ALI would have courts suppress evidence only when

constitutional

violation

is

"substantial."

The

recommended

provision lists 6 factors that a court should consider in determining whether a violation was substantial such as "the extent to
which the violation was wilful" and "the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations."
ly a contrived

term~

the circumstances."

"Substantiality" is real-

the ALI might as well have used "totality of
I have attached a copy of the ALI standard.

It is the best, all-inclusive standard that I have heard of or
seen. 1

Footnote(s} 1 will appear on following pages.

7

2.

I

am unaware of any Supreme Court cases that have ex-

pressly stated that the exclusionary rule should be used to deter
magistrate misbehavior.

Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442

u.s.

319 (1979) was a case in which the "Town Justice" who issued the
warrant

accompanied

the

police

to

the

site of

the

search

and

listed the items to be searched for as they were discovered.

The

Court found

The

that the evidence should have been suppressed.

Court apparently was not faced with the argument that the exclusionary

rule

should

not

apply to "detached

judicial officers."

Of course, the argument could be made that the reasonable police
officer should have realized that the post-facto determination of
probable cause in Lo-Ji violated the 4th Amendment.
A quick West-Law search turned up United States v. Janis, 428
U.S.

433

( 1976) ,

in which the Court stated

(per Blackmun, J.):

"The Court, however, has established that the 'prime purpose' of
the rule,

if not the sole one,

lice conduct.'"
it could

Although

support

'is to deter future unlawful ..::...po-

this statement is somewhat ambiguous,

the conclusion

that

the exclusionary

rule

is

intended only to deter police misconduct and not the misconduct
of

a member

of

the

judicial branch.

that result does not make much sense.

I continue to think that
It seems to me that the

exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedial rule designed

I

1 If you decide to use a "double standard," I would suggest one
that requires exclusion only where police officers have failed to
act with "reasonabl~, good faith," United States v. Williams, 622
F.2d 830, 847 (1980), or where a ~rate's conduct is
"flagrantly abusive" of 4th Amendment rights. Brown v. Illinois,
422U.S. 590,610 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).

-

to encourage adherence to the 4th Amendment.
"""'-~

In my mind, the

courts should be anxious to encourage all adherence,

not just

that of the executive branch.

3.

You wanted a one paragraph abstract of three cases.

I

will try my best to be concise.

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 ( 1978) : The petr was tried
for rape and related charges.

Before his trial, he moved to sup-

press some evidence on the ground that the police affidavit supporting the search warrant by which the evidence was discovered
contained

material

misstatements.

(The

relied on the remarks of an informant.)

affiant

primarily

had

The Court held that in

order to have the evidence suppressed the petr would have to show
that th m

ff iant included the false statement in the af f ida vi t

knowingly and intentionally,
truth,

and

o~ith

reckless disregard for the

that the statement was necessary to the finding of

probable cause.

The Court reached its decision after weighing

the pros and cons of excluding probative evidence;.

Obviously,

the Court's holding lends some support to the recognition of a
"good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule.

So long as the

affiant acts in "reasonable good faith," the evidence will not be
excluded.

Nevertheless, the Court's holding is couched in narrow

terms that seem to apply only to the situation at issue in the
case--affidavits containing misstatements.

Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443

u.s.

31 (1979):

A Detroit ordi-

nance made it unlawful for an individual to refuse to identify
himself and provide evidence of his identity after being stopped
for having suspicious behavior.

The petr was arrested pursuant

to the ordinance and searched.

Drugs were discovered.

refused to suppress the evidence.

The TC

The Mich. Ct. App. found the

ordinance unconstitutionally vague, the arrest unreasonable, the
search invalid, and the drugs subject to the exclusionary rule.
The Court reversed.

The Court stated:

"This Court repeatedly has explained that 'probable
cause' to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable
caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that
the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about
to commit an offense.
On this record there was
abundant probable cause to satisfy the constitutional
prerequisite for an arrest." Id., at 443.
Under this reasoning, instead of recognizing a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court was able to hold that
the 4th Amendment had not been violated in the first place.

United States v. Johnson, 457

u.s.

537 (1982):

The resp was

arrested by Secret Service agents who had entered his home without an arrest warrant.
...

......._

Resp made some incriminating statements

~

following his arrest.

He sought to suppress those statements on

the ground that his warrantless arrest was unconstitutional under
the holding of Payton v.

New York,

445

u.s.

573

(1980).

The

issue was whether Payton should be applied retroactively.

The

Court found that under traditional retroactivity doctrine, Payton
should be applied retroactively.

The majority opinion does not

provide any support for
but the dissent
argued

an exception to the exclusionary rule,

(BRW, for CJ, WHR, and SOC) does.

persuasively

that

Justice White

retroactive application of

rule would do little to deter police misconduct.

the Payton

t '~
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part II-Stai nte

....
I

on a charge which, purdid not authorize the

as for intermingled docuents of Subsection SS 230.1
or

·'!'

.'

seizure, were not authorizE:d
ctions SS 230.3, 230.4, 230.5,

(2) Determination. A m_9tion to suppress evidence pursuant to this section s!;all be granted only if the court finds
that the violation upon wliich it is basea was substantial, or
if "Otfiervnse require d by the Constitution of the United
States or of this State.

zure based on consent,

as not given by any person
ent binding on the moving

the search by which the
:overed exceeded the scope

( 4) Circumstances to Be Considered in Determining
Substantiality. In determining whether a violation not
covered by Subsection (3) is substantial, the court shall
consider all the circumstances including:

t

l

order or port seizure, the
rs seized were discovered
·Section SS 260.2; or

(a) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct;
(b) The extent to which the violation was wilful;

ure resulting from a search
emergency search, the re260.3 or 260.5, as the case

(c) the extent to which privacy was invaded;
(d) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of this Code;

1re resulting from a search
pendently of a search, the

(e) whether, but for the violation, the things
seized would have been discovered; and
(

~~;.~....,... ~·-&(
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(3) Violations Deemed Substantial. A violation shall
in all cases be deemed substantial if it \\'as gross, wilful and
prejudicial to the accused. A violation shall be deemed
·wilful regardless of the good faith of the individual officer
if it appears to be part of the practice of the law enforcement agency or was authorized by a high authority within it.

require d by Subsections SS
!ase may be, was not given;

.

11-u~

If the court finds a violation not to be substantial it··~
..
shall set forth its reasons for such finding.

s not voluntary ; or

~ ~-

290.2
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Y which the things seized
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uiremcnts of Sections SS 260.4 or 260.6, as the

1

30.2,

§

-

-.. _:--=;

..

,--- _ - .. ~--'2:""'-..: .--.. ':

----- .

:---:.=·~=-~-~----

...

J

• y

§

--...
.

~~ -~--~·-- -·-

.. ".;

.... ...

_:---

_

_-·.._- --:-

~
.. .:.,.. ___ ~.!_.-- --

..;.

.:·--;-.--:;;...

.:.

~- ..----~~~-· --:.~~

--·;-

..

-·J-·-

--=-

. ~~~:}E~~if~·:.___
-·

~

-

--

,.:-:.. ...;

-..:·

---~-

::~:::-~~~-:-1!~~~-:::..--~
-

...

11

-

.

.. ,-

. ---

ss

290.2

Code of Prc-Arra)gnmcnt

Proce~u!·p

(f) the extent to which the violation prejudiced
the moving party's ability to support his motion, or to
defend himself in the proceeding in which the things
seized are sought to be offered in evidence against him.
(5) E'rmts of Prior Unlav.rful Search. If a searc
e is carried out in such a manner that thing
of the search would be subject
suppression
pursuant to t
receding subsections
is section, and if
ch or se ·
other evidence is dis- ___ _ ;
as a result of such
covered subsequently an
ed against a defendant, such
o sup · ssion unless the prosecu .
evidence shall be subje
tion establishes t
such evidence
uld probably have
been discovc
y law enforcement author · s irrespective
rch or seizure, and the court finds tha ·elusion
of ch evidence is not necessary t.o deter violations o
Code.
(6) Evidence of Reasonable Cause Unlav;rfully Obtained. Any evidence obtained in the course of a search the
validity . of which is dependent upon reasonable cause,
,
whether pursuant to a search or arrest warrant, a warrantless arrest, or other authority specified in this Part II, shall
be subject to a motion to suppress if the finding of reasonable cause, or the officer's reasonable belief, as the case may
be, was based in necessary part on information unlaVirfully
acquired by an officer from the defendant or any other
person described in Subsection SS 290.1 (5).
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Subsection (1) specifies that a motion to suppress may be based
upon a violation of any provision of the Code, and then lists, for
descriptive purposes, the principal grounds upon which such
motions have been, or are likely to be, based. Many of these, if
established, mandate exclusion w1der !liapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), and other Court decisions.
Subsections (2) through ( 4) make provision for the exclusion
of fYidence obtained as a rrsult of violations of the Cod«>'s provi-
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

c..t · S .e:;_/ Z

Ten years ago in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974), I expressed the fear that the Court's decision "may
signal . that a majority of my colleagues have positioned
themselves to reopen the door [to evidence secured by official
lawlessness] still further and abandon altogether the
.exclusionary rule in search-and-seizure cases."
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting).

Id., at 365

Since then, in case after case, I

have witnessed the Court's gradual but determined strangulation
of the rule.l

It now appears that the Court's victory over the

Fourth Amendment is complete.

That today's decision represents

the piece de resistance of the Court's past efforts cannot be

1 see, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 u.s. 531, 544 (1975)
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting); United States v • . Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
460 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s.
465, 502 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31, 41 (1978) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 629 (1980) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).

I

7

doubted, for today the Court sanctions the use in the
prosecution's case-in-chief of illegally obtained evidence
against the individual whose rights have been violated--a result
that had previously been thought to be foreclosed.
What is perhaps most striking about the Court's opinion is
the patina of empirical precision suggested by its sober talk of
"costs" and "benefits."

But the language of deterrence and of

cost/benefit analysis, if used indiscriminately, can have a
narcotic effect.

It creates an illusion of . technical precision

and ineluctability.

It suggests that·not only constitutional

principle but empirical data supports the majority's result.
When the Court's analysis is examined carefully, however, it is
clear that we have not been treated to an honest assessment of
the merits of the exclusionary rule, but have instead been drawn
into a curious world where the "costs" of · ~~cluding illegally
obtained evidence loom to exaggerated heights and where the
."benefits" of such exclusion are made to disappear with a mere
wave of the hand.
..

It is crucial, therefore, to recall the fundamental
constitutional importance of what is at stake here.

While the

machinery of law enforcement and indeed the nature of crime
itself has changed dramatically since the Fourth Amendment became
part of the Nation's fundamental law in 1791, what the Framers
understood then remains true today--that the task of combatting
crime and convicting the guilty will in every era seem of such
critical and pressing concern that we may be lured by the
temptations of expediency into forsaking our commitment to

protecting individual liberty and privacy.

It was for that very

reason that the Framers of the Bill of Rights insisted that law
enforcement efforts be permanently and unambiguously restricted
in order to preserve personal freedoms.

In the constitutional

scheme they ordained, the sometimes unpopular task of ensuring
that the government's enforcement efforts remain within the
strict boundaries fixed by the Fourth Amendment was entrusted to
the courts.

As James Madison boldly predicted in his address to

the First Congress on June 8, 1789:

"If [these rights] are incorporated into the
Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians
of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the Legislative or
Executive; they will naturally be led to resist every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in
the Constitution by the declaration of rights." · 1
Annals of Cong. 439 (1789).
·
If those independent tribunals lose their resolve, however, as
.the Court has done today, and give way . to the call of expediency,
the vital guarantees of the Fourth Amendment are reduced to
nothing more than a "form of words."
United States, 251

u.s.

Silverthoine Lumber Co. v.

385, 392 (1920).

A proper understanding of the broad purposes sought to be
served by the Fourth Amendment demonstrates, in my judgment, that
the principles embodied in the exclusionary rule rest upon a far
firmer constitutional foundation than the shifting sands of the
Court's deterrence rationale.

But even if I were to accept the

Court's chosen method of analyzing the question posed by these
cases, I would still be forced to conclude that the Court's

decision cannot be justified.
I

In these cases, the Court holds that physical evidence
seized by police officers reasonably relying upon a warrant
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate is admissible in the
prosecution's case-in-chief, even though a reviewing court has
subsequently determined that the warrant was defective, No. 82963, or that those officers failed to demonstrate when applying
for the warrant that there was probable cause to conduct the
search, No. 82-1771.

I have no doubt that these decisions will

prove in time to have been a grave mistake.

But, as troubling

and important as today's new doctrine may be for the
administration of criminal justice in this country, the
analytical underpinning of the Court's decision also requires
extended critical examination, for it may .. prove in the long run
to pose the greater threat to our civil liberties.
A
At bottom, the Court's decision turns on .the proposition
that the exclusionary rule is merely a "'judicrally created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right.'"

Ante, at 7, quoting United States v.

Calandra, 414 U.S., at 348.

The germ of that idea, of course, is

found in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 {1949), and although I had
thought that such a narrow conception of the Yule had been
forever put to rest by our decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
{1961), it has been revived by the present Court and indeed

reaches full flower with today's decision.

The essence of this

view, as expressed initially in the Calandra opinion and as
reiterated today, is the claim that the sole

"pur~ose

of the

Fourth Amendment is to prevent unreasonable governmental
intrusions into the privacy of one's person, house, papers, or
effects.

The wrong condemned is the unjustified governmental

invasion of these areas of an individual's life.

That wrong ...

is fully accomplished by the original search without probable
cause."

414

u.s.,

at 354 (emphasis added): see also ante, at 7.

This reading of the Amendment implies that its proscriptions are
directed solely at those governmental agents who may actually
invade an individual's constitutionally protected privacy.

The

courts, under such a view, are not subject to any direct
constitutional duty to exclude illegally obtained evidence,
because the question of the

admissibility · ~t

such evidence does

not come within the scope of the Fourth Amendment's concerns.

In

,the Court's view, the subsequent admission of such evidence
"work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong."

Calandra, supra, at
..

354.

The courts, therefore, are relegated to the periphery: the

only constitutionally cognizable injury having already been
"fully accomplished" by the police, and having no direct
constitutional responsibility for such official wrongdoing, the
best judges can do is to wring their hands and hope that perhaps
by excluding such evidence they can "deter" future transgressions
by the police.
Such a reading appears plausible, because, as critics of
the exclusionary rule never tire of repeating, 2 the Fourth

Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.

Amendment makes no express provision for the exclusion of
evidence secured in violation of its commands.

A short answer to

this claim, of course, is that many of the Constitution's most
vital imperativesf re stated in general terms and the task of
giving meaning to these precepts is therefore left to subsequent
judicial decision-making in the

context of concrete cases.

The

nature of our Constitution, as Chief Justice Marshall long ago
explained, "requires that only its great outlines should be
marked, its important objects designated, and the minor
ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the
nature of the objects themselves."
Wheat. 316, 407

(1819).

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4

A more direct answer may be supplied by

focusing on the fact that the Court's current interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment simply fails to take .adequate account of the
reasons why the police might seek to invade . an individual's
privacy in the first place or the reasons why the Framers were
.concerned to restrict such invasions.

What the Court appears to

have forgotten is that virtually every seizure of evidence--an
executive act plainly covered by the terms of th~ Amendment-looks beyond itself to some potential later use of the evidence
at trial.

Indeed, the seizure of evidence by the government is

hardly intelligible without some reference to the courts.
When that central fact is kept in mind, the role of the

2see, e.g., Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid
Evidence?, 62 Judicature 215 (1978): S. Schlesinger, Exclusionary
Injustice (1977).

·.
courts and their possible involvement in the concerns of the
Fourth Amendment comes into sharper focus.

Since seizures are

executed principally to secure evidence, and since such evidence
generally has utility in our legal system only in the context of

-

a trial supervised by a judge, it is readily apparent that the
courts are integrally connected to the use of evidence. 3

Once

that connection between the evidence-gathering role of the police
and the evidence-admitting function of the courts is
acknowledged, the plausibility of the Court's interpretation
becomes more suspect.

Certainly nothing in the language or

history of the Fourth Amendment suggests that a recognition of
this evidentiary link between the police and the courts was meant
to be foreclosed. 4

Indeed, it is difficult to give any meaning

3 In deciding to enforce the exclusionary -:rule as a matter of
state law, the California Supreme Court clearly recognized this
point:
·
"When, as in the present · case, the very purpose of an illegal
.search and seizure is to get evidence to introduce at a trial,
the success of the lawless venture depends entirely on the
court's lending its aid by allowing the evidence to be
introduced.
It is no answer to say that a distinction should be
drawn between the government acting as law enforcer and the
gatherer of evidence and the government acting as judge." People
v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P. 2d 905, 912 (1955).
For a thoughtful examination of this point, see Schrock & Welsh,
Upr from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Requirement, 59 Minn. L. Rev. 251, 289-307 (1974).
4 Examination of the early State declarations of rights which
formed the models for the Fourth Amendment reveals that they were
aimed as much at explicitly limiting the manner in which
government could gather evidence as at protecting individual
privacy. For example, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780
provided:
~
"Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable ~
searches and seizures of his person, his house, his papers and
. ~~ ~
his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this ~ J
Footnote continued on next page.
~~

~

at all to the limitations imposed by the Amendment if it is read
as simply proscribing certain conduct by the police but allowing
other agents of the same government freely to take advantage of
any evidence secured by the police in violation of its
requirements. 5

Therefore, if a full account of the purposes of

searches and seizures is given and if the reality of the
situation that the Amendment was intended to address is

right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously
supported by oath or affirmation, and if the order in the warrant
to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to
arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property,
be not accompanied with a special designation of the person or
objects of search, arrest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be
issued, but in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the
laws." Art. XIV of the Declaration of Rights of 1780. See
generally T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation
41-43 (1969); N. Lasson, The History and Development of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 51-105 (1970);
J. Lanynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court·: A Study in
Constitional Interpretation 30-48 (1966); Stewart, The Road to
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development, and Future of
the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L.
Rev. 1365, 1369 (1983).
5 In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 u.s. 385
(1920), the Court expressly recognized this point in rejecting
the Government's contention that it should be p~rmitted to make
use of knowledge obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment:
"The Government now while in form repudiating and condemning the
illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its right to avail itself of
the knowledge obtained by that means which otherwise it would not
have had.
"The proposition could not be presented more nakedly.
It is
that although of course its ~eizure was an outrage which the
Government now regrets, it may stuay the papers Defore it returns
them, copy them, and then may use the knowledge that it has
gained to call upon the owners in a more regular form to produce
them ••••
In our opinion such is not the law.
It reduces the
Fourth Amendment to a form a words. The essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court but that it shall not be used at all."
Id., at 391-392
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
--

~-

~~1-'1

~~,__.,.......-,

,--

~~

~~

acknowledged, the Amendment must be read to condemn not only the
initial unconstitutional invasion of privacy--which is done,
after all, for the purpose of securing evidence--but also the
subsequent use of any evidence so obtained.
By taking what appears to be a deliberately myopic view of
the consequences of a search or seizure, however, the Court seeks

---

to draw an artificial line between the constitutional rights and

--

responsibilities that are engaged by actions of the police and
those that are engaged when a defendant appears before the
courts.

On such a narrow view, the substantive protections of

the Fourth Amendment right can be viewed as wholly exhausted at
the moment when police unlawfully invade an individual's privacy,
and no substantive force remains therefore to those protections
at the time of trial when the government seeks to use evidence
obtained by the police during this invasion of the individual's
privacy.
I submit that such a crabbed
_....___... reading of the Fourth
Amendment wrenches the Amendment from its historical roots, casts
aside the teaching of those Justices who first

~ormulated

the

exclusionary rule, and rests ultimately on an impoverished
understanding of judicial responsibility in our constitutional
scheme.

For my part, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures" comprises a personal right to exclude all
evidence secured by means of unreasonable

sea~ches

and seizures.

The right to be free from the initial invasion of privacy and the
right of exclusion are coordinate components of the central

7

-
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-

embracing right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Such a conception of the rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment was unquestionably the original basis of what has come
to be called the exclusionary rule when it was first formulated
in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

There the Court

considered whether evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment by a United States Marshal could be admitted at trial
after the defendant had moved that the evidence be returned.
Significantly, although the Court clearly considered the
Marshal's initial invasion of the defendant's home to be
unlawful, it went on to consider a question that "involves the
right of the court in a criminal prosecution to retain for the
purposes of evidence the letters and correspondence of the
accused, seized in his house in his absende without his
authority, by a United States Marshal holding no warrant for the
. .•• search of his premises."

Id., at 393.

In answering that

question, Justice Day, speaking for a unanimous Court, expressly
recognized that the commands of the Fourth Amendment were
addressed t f oth the courts and agents of the executive branch:

"The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the
courts of the United States and Federal officials, in
the exercise of their power and authority, under
limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such
power and authority, and to forever secure the people,
their persons, houses, papers and effects against all
unreasonable searches and seizures under· the guise of
law. This protection reaches all alike, whether
accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving it
force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under
our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of

-
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the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful
seizures ••• should find no sanction in the judgments
of the courts which are charged at all times with the
support of the Constitution and to which people of all
conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance
of such fundamental rights."
Id., at 391-392.
The heart of the Weeks opinion, and for me the beginning of
wisdom about the Fourth Amendment's proper meaning, is found in
the following passage:

"If letters and private documents can ••• be
seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen
accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such
searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the
courts and [federal] officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be
aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which
have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental
law of the land. The United States ~arshal could only
have invaded the house of the accused when armed with a
warrant issued as required by the Constitution •.••
Instead, he acted without sanction of law, doubtless
prompted by the desire to bring further proof to the
aid of the Government, and under color of his office
undertook to make a seizure of private papers in direct
violation of the constitutional prohibition against
such action •••. To sanction such proceedings would be
to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if
not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the
Constitution, intended for the protection of the people
against such unauthorized action."
232 U.S., at 393394.
What this passage succinctly captures is the essential
recognition, ignored by the present Court, that seizures are
generally executed for the purpose of bringing "proof to the aid
of the Government," id., at 393, that the utility of such
evidence in a criminal prosecution arises ultimately in the
context of the courts, and therefore that the courts cannot be

-
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absolved of responsibility for the means by which evidence is
obtained.

As the Court in Weeks clearly recognized, the

responsibilities cast upon government by the Fourth Amendment are
not confined merely to the police.
summarized by Justice Holmes:

The essence of this point was

"If the search and seizure are

unlawful as invading personal rights secured by the Constitution
those rights would be infringed yet further if the evidence were
allowed to be used."
(1926).

Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532

As the Court further explained in United States v.

Olmstead, 277

u.s.

438 (1928):

"The striking outcome of the Weeks case and those
which followed it was the sweeping declaration that the
Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or limiting
the use of evidence in courts, really forbade its
introduction if obtained by government officers though
a violation of the Amendment. There~o~ore many had
supposed under the ordinary common law rules, if the
tendered evidence was pertinent, the method of
obtaining it was unimportant .••• But in the Weeks
case, and those which followed, this Court decided with
great emphasis, and established as the law for the
federal courts, that the protection of the _Fourth
Amendment would be much impaired unless i~ was held
that not only was the official violator of the rights
under the Amendment subject to an action at the suit of
the injured defendant, but also that the evidence
thereby obtained could not be received."
Id., at 462463.
Such a conception of the rule, in my view, is more faithful
to the meaning and purpose of the Fourth Amendment and to the
judiciary's role as the guardian of the
liberties.

p~ople's

constitional

In contrast to the present Court's restrictive

reading, the Court in Weeks recognized that, if the Amendment is
to have any meaning, police and the courts cannot be regarded as
constitutional strangers to each other; because the evidence-

gathering role of the police is directly linked to the evidenceadmitting function of the courts, an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights may be undermined as completely by one as by the
other.

In this way, therefore, the exclusionary rule serves "the

twin goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of
partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people-all potential victims of unlawful government conduct--that the
government will not profit from its lawless behavior."

United

States v. Calandra, supra, at 357 {BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
B

From the foregoing it is clear why the question whether or
not the exclusion of evidence would deter future police
misconduct was never even considered as a relevant concern in the
early cases from Weeks to Olmstead;6 for -in those formative
decisions, the Court plainly understood that exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence was simply the vindication of a
·direct constitional command, rather than merely the enforcement
of a judicially fashioned remedy.

A new phase in the history of

the rule, however, opened with the Court's deci·sion in Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 u.s. 25 {1949).

Although that decision held that

the security of one's person and privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment was "implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty' and

6 see generally Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary
Rule Rest On A "Principled Basis" Rather Than An "Empirical
Proposition"?, 16 Creighton L. Rev. 565, 598-599; Mertens &
Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:
Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 Geo. L. J. 365,
379-380 (1981).

I
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as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment, id., at 27-28, quoting Palko
v. Connecticut, 302

u.s.

319, 325 (1937), the Court went on, in

what can only be regarded as a tour de force of constitutional
obfuscation, to say that the "ways of enforcing such a basic
right raise questions of a different orde!,"

338

u.s.,

at 28.

Notwithstanding the force of the Fourth Amendment and the force
of the Weeks doctrine that the Amendment required exclusion, a
state court was free to admit illegally seized evidence,
according to the Court in Wolf, so long as the state had devised
some other "effective" means of vindicating a defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights.

!d., at 31.

Twelve years later, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
however, the Court restored the original understanding of the
Weeks case by overruling the holding of Wolf and by repudiating
its rationale.

Although in the course of reaching this

1conclusion the Court in Mapp responded at certain points to the
question, first raised in Wolf, of whether the .exclusionary rule
was an "effective" remedy compared to alternat(ve means of
enforcing the right, see id., at 651-653, it nevertheless
expressly held that "all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court."
added).

Id., at 655 (emphasis

In the Court's view, the exclusionary rule was not one

among a range of options to be selected at the discretion of
judges, it was "an essential part of both the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments."

Id., at 657.

Rejection of the Wolf

..

- 15 -

approach was constitionally required, the Court explained,
because "the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf
could not consistently tolerate the denial of its . most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure.

To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in

reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment."

Id., at 656.

Indeed, no other explanation suffices to account for the Court's
holding in Mapp, since the only constitutionally valid predicate
for the Court's conclusion that the States were bound by the
Fourteenth Amendment to honor the Weeks doctrine is that the
exclusionary rule was "part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's
limitation upon [governmental] encroachment of individual
privacy." Id., at 651.7

7 Indeed, the Court in Mapp expressly noted that the "factual
considerations" raised in Wolf concerning the effectiveness of
.alternative remedies "are not basically relevant to a decision
that the exclusionary rule is an essential ingredient of the
Fourth Amendment." 367 u.s., at 651. Of course it is true that
in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 u.s. 618 (1965), in holding that
Mapp was not to be applied retroactively, the Court described the
exclusionary rule as the "only effective deterrent to lawless
police action," id., at 637, thereby suggesting that the rule
rested almost exclusively on a deterrence rationale. But, as I
have explained on another occasion, "[t]he emphasis upon
deterrence in Linkletter must be understood in the light of the
crucial fact that the States had justifiably relied from 1949 to
1961 upon Wolf ••• , and consequently, that application of Mapp
would have required the wholesale release of innumerable
convicted prisoners, few of whom could have been successfully
retried.
In that circumstance, Linkletter .held not only that
retrospective application of Mapp would not further the goal of
deterrence but also that it would not further · 'the administration
of justice and the integrity of the judicial process.' 381 u.s.,
at 637." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S., at 359-360.

-

.l.O
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Despite this clear pronouncement, however, the Court since
Calandra has gradually pressed the deterrence rationale for the
rule back to center stage.

Although, as I have explained, see

supra, at ___, I believe the exclusionary rule rests on a
constitutional principle quite distinct from the deterrence
rationale, I am also persuaded after witnessing the Court's
efforts to grapple with the implications of such a justification
for the rule that the analysis is so problematic that it simply
cannot provide courts with either an accurate or fair means of
considering whether the rule should apply in particular
circumstances.

First of all, much of the focus on the so-called

costs of the exclusionary rule reflects, in my view, a seriously
misdirected criticism.

If nothing else, the Fourth Amendment

plainly operates to disable the

governmen~

from gathering

information and securing evidence in certain ways.

In practical

terms, of course, this restriction of official power means that
•Some incriminating evidence will inevitably go undetected if the
government obeys these constitutional restraints.

It is the loss

of that evidence that is the "price" our society _pays for
enjoying the freedom and privacy safeguarded by the Fourth
Amendment.

Thus, some criminals will go free not, in Justice

(then Judge} Cardozo's misleading metaphor, "because the
constable has blundered," People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150
N.E. 585, 587 (1926}, but rather because official compliance with
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment makes it more difficult
to catch criminals.

Understood in this way, the Fourth Amendment

directly contemplates that some reliable and incriminating

- 17 -

evidence will be lost to the government, and thus it is not the
exclusionary rule but rather the Amendment itself that has
imposed this cost. 8
In addition, the entire enterprise of attempting to assess
the deterrence benefits and costs of the rule is a virtually
impossible task for courts to perform honestly or accurately.
Although the Court's language suggests that some specific
empirical basis may support its analysis, the reality is that the
Court's opinions in this area represent an inherently unstable
compound of

i~n,

h~es

and often inconclusive data.
v-

and occasional pieces of partial
In Calandra, for example, the Court

8 Justice Stewart has explained this point in detail in a
recent article:
"Much .pf the criticism leveled at the exclusionary rule is
misdirected; it is more properly directed · ftt the Fourth Amendment
itself. It is true that, as many observers have charged, the
effect of the rule is to deprive the courts· of extremely
relevant, often direct evidence of the guilt of the defendant.
But these same critics fail to acknowledge that, in many
·instances, the same extremely relevant evidence would not have
been obtained had the police officer complied with the commands
of the fourth amendment in the first place ...•. ...
"The exclusionary rule places no limitations on the actions of
the police. The fourth amendment does. The inevitable result of
the Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures and its requirements that no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause is that police officers who obey its
strictures will catch fewer criminals. .•.
[T]hat is the price
the framers anticipated and were willing to pay to ensure the
sanctity of the person, home, and property against unrestrained
governmental power." Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and
Beyond: The Origins, Development apa Future of the Exclusionary
Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases ~ 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 13921393 (1983) (emphasis added).
See also Dellinger, Of Rights and
Remedies: The Constitution As A Sword, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1532,
1563 (1972) ("Under the exclusionary rule a court attempts to
maintain the status quo that would have prevailed if the
constitutional requirement had been obeyed").
•

-p~~
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had before it no concrete evidence whatever concerning the impact
that application of the rule to grand jury proceedings would have
in terms of either the long-term costs or the expected benefits.
To the extent empirical data is available, it has shown, on the
one hand, as the Court acknowledges today, that the costs are not
as substantial as critics have asserted in the past, see ante, at
8, n. 6, and, on the other hand, that while the exclusionary rule
may well have certain deterrent effects, it is extremely
difficult to assess with any degree of precision whether the
incidence of unlawful conduct by police is now lower than it was
prior to Mapp.

See Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s., at 492, n. 32;

United States v. Janis, 428 u.s. 433, 449-453 and n. 22 (1976) • 9
The Court has sought to turn this uncertainty to its advantage by
casting the burden of proof upon

proponent~

of the rule, see,

e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 u.s., a~ ~53-454.

"Obviously,"

however, "the assignment of the burden of proof on an issue where
1

evidence does not exist and cannot be obtained is outcome

determinative.

[The] assignment of the burden ·is merely a way of
.
·10
announcing a predetermined conclusion."
.'

9 see generally on this point, Davies, A Hard Look at What We
Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the
Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost"
Arrests, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 611, 627-629; Canon,
Ideology and Reality in the Debate over the Exclusionary Rule: A
Conservative Argument for its Retention, 23 s. Tex. L. J. 559,
561-563 (1982); Critique, On the Limitation of the Empirical
Evaluation of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spioto
Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 N~. U. L. Rev. 740
(1974).
Footnote(s) 10 will appear on following pages.

By remaining within its redoubt of empiricism and by basing
the rule solely on the deterrence rationale, the Court has robbed
the rule of legitimacy.

A doctrine that is explained as if it

were an empirical proposition but for which there is only limited
empirical support is both inherently unstable and an easy mark
for critics.

Indeed, JUSTICE BLACKMUN frankly admits "the

unavoidably provisional nature of today's decisions."
(concurring opinion).

Ante, at

The extent of this Court's fidelity to

Fourth Amendment requirements, however, should not turn on such
statistical uncertainties.

I share the view, expressed by

Justice Stewart for the Court in Faretta v. California, 422

u.s.

806 (1975), that "[p]ersonal liberties are not based on the law
of averages."

Id., at 834.

Rather than seeking to give effect

to the - liberties secured by the Fourth Amerdment through
guesswork about deterrence, the Court should restore to its
proper place the principle framed 70 years ago in Weeks that an
·individual whose privacy has been invaded in violation of the
Fourth Amendment has a right grounded in that Amendment to
,

prevent the government from subsequently making· use of any

10 Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment:
The Limits of Lawyering, 48 Ind. L. J. 329, 332-333 (1973). See
also White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate,
81 Mich. L. Rev. 1273, 1281-1282 (1983) (balancing of deterrent
benefits and costs is an "inquiry that can never be performed in
an adequate way and the reality is thus that - the decision must
rest not upon those grounds, but upon prior dispositions or
unarticulated intuitions that are never justified"); Canon,
Ideology and Reality in the Debate over the Exclusionary Rule: A
Conservative Argument for its Retention, 23 S. Tex. L. J. 559,
564 (1982); Kamisar, supra, at 646.

evidence so obtained.
II
Application of that principle clearly requires affirmance
in the two cases decided today.

In the first, United States v.

Leon, No. 82-1771, it is conceded by the Government and accepted
by the Court that the affidavit filed by the police officers in
support of their application for a search warrant failed to
provide a sufficient basis on which a neutral and detached
magistrate gQ Uld conclude that there was probable cause to
I._

the warrant.

-...n

Specifically, it is conceded that the officers'

application for a warrant was based in part on information
supplied by a confidential informant of unproved reliability that
was over five months old by the time it was relayed to the
police. _ Although the police conducted an independent
investigation on the basis of this tip, bbth the District Court
and the Court of Appeals concluded that the additional
.information gathered by the officers failed to corroborate the
details of the informant's tip and was "as
innocence as with guilt."

cons . i~tent

..
App. to Pet. for Cert; lOa.

warrant, therefore, should never have issued.

with
The

Stripped of the

authority of the warrant, the conduct of these officers was
plainly unconstitutional--it amounted to nothing less than a
naked invasion of the privacy of respondents' homes without the
requisite justification demanded by the Fourth Amendment.

In

order to restore the Government to the position it would have
been in had this unconstitutional search not occurred, therefore,
it was necessary that the evidence be suppressed.

As we said in

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

u.s.

443 (1971), the Warrant

Clause is not "an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' against
the claims of police efficiency.

It is, or should be, an

important working part of our machinery of government, operating
as a matter of course to check the 'well-intentioned but
mistakenly over-zealous executive officers' who are part of any
system of law enforcement."

Id., at 481.

A close examination of the facts of this case reveals that
this is neither an extraordinary nor indeed · a very costly step.
The warrant had authorized a search for cocaine, methaqualone
tablets, and miscellaneous narcotics paraphenalia at several
locations: a condominium at 7902 Via Magdelena in Los Angeles; a
residence at 620 Price Drive in Burbank; a

~esidence

at 716 South

Sunset ·Canyon in Burbank; and four automobiles owned respectively
-.·
by respondents Leon, Sanchez, Stewart, and Del Castillo. App.
31-33.

Pursuant to this warrant, the officers seized

•approximately four pounds of cocaine and over 1,000 methaqualone
tablets from the Via Magdalena condominium, nearly one pound of
cocaine from the Sunset Canyon residence, about· an ounce of
cocaine from the Price Drive residence, and certain paraphenalia
from Del Castillo's and Stewart's automobiles.

On the basis of

this and other evidence, the four respondents were charged with
violating 21

u.s.c.

§846 for conspiring to possess and distribute

cocaine, and §84l(a) (1) for possessing methaqualone and cocaine
with intent to distribute.

The indictment specifically alleged

that respondents had maintained the Via Magdelena condominum as a
storage area for controlled substances which they distributed to

prospective purchasers.

App. 27-28.

At the suppression hearing, the District Court determined
that none of the respondents had a sufficient expectation of
privacy to contest the search of the Via Magdelena condominium,
that respondents Stewart and Sanchez could challenge the search
of their home at Price Drive, that respondent Leon was entitled
to challenge the search of his home at Sunset Canyon, and that
respondents Del Castillo and Stewart could contest the search of
their cars.

Given its finding that probable cause to issue the

warrant was lacking, the District Court ruled that the evidence
from the Price Drive residence could not be used against

.

respondents Stewart and Sanchez, that evidence from the Sunset
Canyon residence could not be used against Leon, and that
evidence obtained from both Del Castillo's and Stewart's
'.

automobiles could not be used against them. ·

App. to Pet. for

Cert. 10a-13a.
\

1

The tenor of the Court's opinion suggests that this order
somehow imposed a grave and presumably unjustifiable "cost" on
society.

Such a suggestion, however, is a gross : exaggeration.

Since the indictment focused upon a conspiracy among all
respondents to use the Via Magdelena condominium as a storage
area for controlled substances, and since the bulk of the
evidence seized was from that condominium and was plainly
admissible under the District Court's order, the Government would
clearly still be able to present a strong case to the jury
following the court's suppression order.

I emphasize these

details not to suggest how the Government's case would fare

before the jury but rather to clarify a point that is lost in the
Court's rhetorical excesses over the costs of the exclusionary
rule--namely, that the suppression of evidence wiil certainly
tend to weaken the Government's position but it rarely
the prosecution.

Cf. infra, at

undermi~es

In my view, a doctrine that

preserves intact the constitutional rights of the accused, and,
at the same time, is sufficiently limited to permit society's
legitimate and pressing interest in criminal law enforcement to
be served should not be so recklessly discarded.

It is a

doctrine that gives life to the "very heart of the Fourth
Amendment directive: that a governmental search and seizure
should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather
evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that
the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a
citizen's private premises."

United Stat~s · v. United States

District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972).
In the second case before the Court, Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, No. 82-963, the State concedes and the .Court accepts
.
that the warrant issued to search respondent's ·home completely
'

failed to state with particularity the things to be seized.
Indeed, the warrant expressly and particularly described things
such as "controlled substances" and "other paraphenalia used in,
for, or in connection with the unlawful possession or use of any
controlled substance" that the police had 'no reason whatsoever to
believe were to be found in respondent's home·.

Given the Fourth

Amendment's requirement that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause

••• and particularly describing ••• the things to

be seized." this warrant should never have been issued.

The

police who entered respondent's home, therefore, were without
constitutional authority to do so.

The effect of - this defective

warrant was to license the officers to enter respondent's home in
search of evidence for which they had made no showing that there
was probable cause to believe could be found there.
Although the Court's opinion tends to overlook this fact,
the requirement of particularity is not a mere "technicality," it
is an express constitutional command.

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444

U.S. 85, 92 (1979); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319
(1979); Stanford v. Texas, 379
States, 275

u.s.

u.s.

192, 196 (1927).

476 (1965); Marron v. United
The purpose of that

requirement is to prevent precisely the kind of governmental
conduct that the faulty

war~an~~~

issue here created a grave

risk of permitting--namely, a search

that ·rw~s

not narrowly and

particularly limited to the things that a neutral and detached
.magistrate had reason to believe might . be found at respondent's
home.

While it is true, as JUSTICE STEVENS

at ___ , that the affidavit submitted by the

ob~erves,

po~ice

see ante,

set forth with

particularity those items that they sought authority to search
for, it is nevertheless clear that the warrant itself--the
document which actually gave the officers legal authority to
invade respondent's privacy--made no mention of these items.
And, although it is true that the particular officers who applied
for the warrant also happened to execute it and did so in
accordance with the limits proposed in their affidavit, this
happenstance should have no bearing on the central question

whether these officers secured that prior judicial authority to
conduct their search required by the Fourth Amendment.

As we

made clear in United States v. United States District Court,
supra, at 317, "the Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior
judicial judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be
reasonably exercised."
347, 356-357 (1967)

See also Katz v. United States, 389

u.s.

("this Court has never sustained a search

upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find
evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their
activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that
end").

Had the warrant actually been enforced by officers other

than those who prepared the affidavit, the same result might not
have occured; indeed, the wholly erroneous nature of the warrant
might have led such officers to feel at liberty to search
throughout respondent's home in search of - ~rugs.
Warden, 401

u.s.

560

(1971).

Cf. Whitely v.

I therefore fail to see how a

.search pursuant to such a fundamentally defective warrant can be
characterized as "reasonable."
What the Framers of the Bill of Rights sought to accomplish
through the express requirements of the Fourth Amendment was to
define precisely the conditions under which government agents
could search private property so that citizens would not have to
depend solely upon the discretion and restraint of those agents
for the protection of their privacy.

Although the self-restraint

and care exhibited by the officers in this case is commendable,
that alone can never be a sufficient protection for
constitutional liberties.

I am convinced that it is not too much

to ask that an attentive magistrate take those minimum steps
necessary to ensure that every warrant he issues describes with
particularity the things which his independent review of the
warrant application convinces him are likely to be found in the
premises.

And I am equally convinced that it is not too much to

ask that well-trained and experienced police officers take a
moment to check that the warrant they have been issued at least
describes those things for which they have sought leave to
search.

These convictions spring not from my own view of sound

criminal law enforcement policy, but are instead compelled by the
language of the Fourth Amendment and the history that led to its
adoption.
III
Even if I were to accept the Court's general approach to
the exclusionary rule, I could not agree with today's result.

- n

~

There is no question that in the hands of the present Court the
.deterrence rationale has proved to be a powerful tool for
confining the scope of the exclusionary rule.

·In Calandra, for

example, the Court concluded that the "speculative and
undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police
misconduct," was insufficient to outweigh the "expense of
substantially impeding the grand jury."

Id., at 351-352.

In

Stone v. Powell, the Court found that the "additional
contribution, if any, of the consideration .of search-and-seizure
claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in
relation to the costs."

428

u.s.,

at 493.

In United States v.

Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the Court concluded that "exclusion

from federal civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a
state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a
sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state
police so that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by
exclusion."

Id., at 454.

And in an opinion handed down today,

the Court finds that the "balance between costs and benefits
comes out against applying the exclusionary rule in civil
deportation hearings held by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service."

INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, No. 83-491 1 slip op., at 17.

Thus, in this bit of judicial stagecraft, while the sets
sometimes change, the actors always have the same lines.

Given

this well-rehearsed pattern, one might have predicted with some
assurance how the present case would unfold.

First there is the

ritual incantation of the "substantial social costs" exacted by
the exclusionary rule, followed by the virtually foreordained
conclusion that, given the marginal benefits, application of the
•rule in the circumstances of these cases is not warranted.

Upon

analysis, however, such a result cannot be justified even on the
.,...
Court's own terms.
At the outset, the Court expresses its concern that society
has been asked to pay a high price--in terms either of setting
guilty persons free or impeding the proper functioning of trials-as a result of excluding relevant physical evidence in cases
where the police, in conducting searches and seizing evidence,
have made only an "objectively reasonable" mistake concerning the
constitutionality of their actions.

See ante, at 7-9.

evidence is there to support such a claim?

But what

Significantly, the Court points to none, and, indeed, as
the Court acknowledges, see ante, at 8, n. 6, recent studies have
demonstrated that the "costs" of the exclusionary rule-calculated in terms of dropped prosecutions and lost convictions-are quite low.

Contrary to the claims of the rule's critics

that exclusion leads to "the release of countless guilty
criminals," Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Officers, 403

u.s.

388, 416 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting), these studies have

demonstrated that federal and state prosecutors very rarely drop
cases because of potential search and seizure problems.

For

example, a 1979 study prepared at the request of Congress by the
General Accounting Office reported that only 0.4% of all cases
actually declined for prosecution by

federa~

prosecutors were

declined primarily because of illegal search problems.

Report of

the Comptroller General of the United States, Impact of the
Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions 14 (1979).

If

lthe GAO data are stated in terms of the percentage of all arrests
that were declined for prosecution as a result of illegal search
' .
·~

problems, the study shows that only 0.2% of a11· felony arrests
are declined because of potential exclusionary rule problems.
See Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn)
About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and
Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 611,
635. 11

Of course, these data describe only the costs

11 In a series of recent studies, researchers have attempted to
quantify with some precision the actual costs of the rule.
A
Footnote continued on next page.

attributable to the exclusion of evidence in all cases; the costs
due to the exclusion of evidence in the narrower category of
cases where police have made objectively reasonable mistakes must
necessarily be even smaller.

The Court, however, ignores this

distinction and makes the mistake of weighing the aggregated
costs of exclusion in all cases, irrespective of the
circumstances that led to exclusion, see ante, at 7-8, against

recent National Institute of Justice study based on data for the
four year period 1976-1979 gathered by the California Bureau of
Criminal Statistics showed that 4.8% of all cases that were
declined for prosecution by California prosecutors were rejected
because of illegally seized evidence. National Institute of
Justice, Criminal Justice Research Report -- The Effects of the
Exclusionary Rule: A Study in California 1 (1982}. However, if
these data are calculated as a percentage of all arrests that
were declined for prosecution, they show that only 0.8% of all
arrests were rejected for prosecution because of illegally seized
evidence. See Davies, supra, at 619.
.
In another measure of the rule's impact-~tDe number of
prosecutions that are dismissed or result '' in acquittals in cases
where evidence has been excluded--the available data again show
that the Court's past assessment of the rule's costs has
generally been exaggerated. For example, a study based on data
,from 9 mid-sized counties in Illinois, -Michigin and Pennsylvania
reveals that motions to suppress physical evidence were filed in
in approximately 5% of the 7,500 cases studied;, but that such
motions were successful in only 0.7% of all these cases.
Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary~ Rule: An
Empirical Assessment, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 585, 596. The
study also shows that only 0.6% of all cases resulted in
acquittals because evidence had been excluded.
Id., at 600.
In
the GAO study, suppression motions were filed in-r0.5% of all
federal criminal cases surveyed, but of the motions filed,
approximately 80-90% were denied. GAO Report, supra, at 8, 10.
Evidence was actually excluded in only 1.3% .of the cases studied,
and only 0.7% of all cases resulted in acquittals or dismissals
after evidence was excluded. Id., at 9-11. - And in another study
based on data from cases during-1978 and 1979 in San Diego and
Jacksonville, it was shown that only 1% of all cases resulting in
nonconviction were caused by illegal searches~ Feeney, Dill &
Weir, Arrests Without Conviction: How Often They Occur and Why
(1983). See generally Davies, supra, at 663.

the potential benefits associated with only those cases in which
evidence is excluded because police reasonably but mistakenly
believe that their conduct does not violate the Fourth Amendment,
see ante, at 16-22.

When such faulty scales are used, it is

little wonder that the balance tips so often in favor of
restricting the application of the rule.
What then supports the Court's insistence upon permitting
this evidence to be admitted?

Apparently, the only answer is the

Court's expressed conviction that even though the costs of
exclusion are not very substantial, the potential deterrent
effect in these circumstances is so marginal that exclusion
cannot be justified.

The key to the Court's conclusion in this

respect is its belief that the prospective deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule operates only in those situations in which
police officers, when deciding whether td~6 forward with some
particular search, have reason to know that their planned conduct
' 1will violate the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

See ante,

at 20-21.

If these officers in fact understand. {or reasonably
..
should understand because the law is well-settieq) that their

proposed conduct will offend the Fourth Amendment and that
consequently any evidence they seize will be suppressed in court,
they will refrain from conducting the planned search.

In those

circumstances, the incentive system created by the exclusionary
rule will have the hoped-for deterrent effect.
the Court, in situations where police

officer~

But, according to
reasonably (but

mistakenly) believe that their planned conduct satisfies Fourth
Amendment requirements--either (a) because they are acting on the

I

basis of an apparently valid warrant, or (b) because their
conduct is only later determined to be invalid as a result of a
subsequent change in the law or the resolution of an unsettled
question of law--then such officers will have no reason to
refrain from conducting the search and, accordingly, the
exclusionary rule will have no effect.
At first blush, there is some logic to this position.
Undoubtedly, in the situation hypothesized by the Court, the
existence of the exclusionary rule cannot be expected to have any
deterrent effect on the particular officers at the moment they
are deciding whether to go forward with the search.

Indeed, the

subsequent exclusion of any evidence seized under such
circumstances appears somehow "unfair" to the particular officers
involved.

As the Court suggests, these officers have acted in

what they thought was an appropriate and constitutionally
authorized manner, but then the fruit of their efforts is
·nullified by the application of the exclusionary rule.

Ante, at

21-22.
..

The flaw in the Court's argument, however; : is that this
logic captures only one comparatively minor element of the
generally acknowledged purposes of the exclusionary rule.

To be

sure, the rule operates to some extent to deter future misconduct
by individual officers who have had evidence suppressed in their
own cases.

But what the Court overlooks is that the rule is not

designed to be, nor should it be thought of as, a form of
"punishment" of individual police officers for their failures to
obey the

r~straints

imposed by the Fourth Amendment.

See United

States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 556-557 (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting).

Instead, the central function of the rule is its

tendency to promote institutional compliance with Fourth
Amendment requirements on the part of law enforcement agencies
generally. 12
the long term,

Thus, as the Court has previously recognized, "over
[the] demonstration [provided by the exclusionary

rule] that our society attaches serious consequences to violation
of constitutional rights is thought to encourage those who
formulate law enforcement policies, and the · officers who
implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their
value system."

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S., at 492.

It is only

through such an institution-wide mechanism that information

12 As Justice Stewart has observed:
"[T]he exclusionary rule is not - designed to serve a specific
deterrence function; that is, it is not designed to punish the
particular police officer for · - ~i~I~ting a person's fourth
amendment rights.
Instead, ·the rule is designed to produce
'systematic deterrence': the exclusionary rule is intended to
,create an incentive for law enforcement officials to establish
procedures by which police officers are trained _to comply with
the fourth amendment because th~ purpose of th~ criminal justice
system--bringing criminals to justice--can be achieved only when
evidence of guilt may be used against defendants~" Stewart,
supra, at 1400. See also Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in
Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 709-710 (1970)
("[t]he exclusionary rule is not aimed at special deterrence
since it does not impose any direct punishment on a law
enforcement official who has broken the rule •••• The
exclusionary rule is aimed at affecting the wider audience of all
law enforcement officials and society at large.
It is meant to
discourage violations by individuals who have never experienced
any sanction for them."); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and
Derailing the Law, 70 Geo. L. J. 365, 399-401 (1981); Kamisar,
Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather Than An "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 Creighton L.
Rev. 565, 597, n. 204 (1983).

,.j

concerning Fourth Amendment standards can be effectively
communicated to rank and file officers. 13
If the overall educational effect of the exclusionary rule
is considered, however, application of the rule to even those

13 Although specific empirical data on the systemic deterrent
effect of the rule is not conclusive, the testimony of those
actually involved in law enforcement suggests that, at the very
least, the Mapp decision had the effect of increasing police
awareness of Fourth Amendment requirements and of prompting
prosecutors and police commanders to work towards educating rank
and file officers. For example, as former New York Police
Commissioner Murphy explained the impact of the Mapp decision: "I
can think of no decision in recent times in the field of law
enforcement which had such a dramatic and traumatic effect ••.• I
was immediately caught up in the entire program of reevaluating
our procedures, which had followed the Defore rule, and
modifying, amending, and creating new policies and new
instructions for implementing Mapp •.••• Retraining sessions had
to be held from the very top administrators down to each of the
thousands of foot patrolmen." Murphy, Judicial Review of Police
Methods in Law Enforcement: The Problem of Compliance by Police
Departments, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 939, 941 (19~6).
Further testimony about the impact of the Mapp decision can be
found in the statement of Deputy Commission~er Reisman: "The Mapp
case was a shock to us. We had to reorganize our thinking,
frankly. Before this, nobody bothered to _take out search
warrants. Although the U.S. Constitution requires warrants in
most cases, the u.s. Supreme Court had ruled that evidence
obtained without a warrant--illegally, if you will--was
admissible in state courts. So the feeling was~ why bother?
Well, once that rule was changed we knew we had · better start
teaching our men about it." N.Y. Times, April 28, 1965, at 50,
col. 1. A former United States Attorney and now Attorney General
of Maryland, Stephen Sachs, has described the impact of the rule
on police practices in similar terms: "I have watched the rule
deter, routinely, throughout my years as a prosecutor ••.•
[P]olice-prosecutor consultation is customary in all our cases
when Fourth Amendment concerns arise .•••
In at least three
Maryland jurisdictions, for example, prosecutors are on twentyfour hour call to field search and seizure questions presented by
police officers." Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's
Defense, 1 Crim. J. Ethics 28, 30 (1982). See also LaFave, The
Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Dr~wing "Bright Lines"
and "Good Faith," 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 307, 319 (1982): Merten &
Wasserstrom, supra, at 394-401.

situations in which individual police officers have acted on the
basis of a reasonable but mistaken belief that their conduct was
authorized can still be expected to have a considerable long-term
deterrent effect.

If evidence is consistently excluded in these

circumstances, police departments will surely be prompted to
instruct their officers to devote greater care and attention to
providing sufficient information to establish probable cause when
applying for a warrant, and to review with some attention the
form of the warrant that they have been issued, rather than
automatically assuming that whatever document the magistrate has
signed will necessarily comport with Fourth Amendment
requirements.
After today's decision, however, that institutional
incentive will be lost.

Indeed, the Court's "reasonable mistake"

exception to the exclusionary rule will tend to put a premium on
police ignorance of the law.

Armed with the assurance provided

1by today's decision that evidence will always ·be admissible
whenever an officer has "reasonably" relied upon . a warrant,
police departments will be encouraged to train officers that if a
warrant has simply been signed, it is reasonable, without more,
to rely on it.

Since in close cases there will no longer be any

incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior, police
would have every reason to adopt a "let's-wait-until-its-decided"
approach in situations in which there is a question about a
warrant's validity or the basis for its issuance.
States v. Johnson, 457

u.s.

Cf. United

537, 561 {1982) • 14

Footnote{s) 14 will appear on following pages.

Although the Court brushes these concerns aside, a host of
grave consequences can be expected to result from the Court's
decision to carve this new exception out of the exclusionary
rule.

A chief consequence of today's decision will be the clear

and unambiguous message conveyed to magistrates that their
decisions to issue warrants are now insulated from subsequent
judicial review.

------------

Creation of this new exception for good faith

reliance upon a warrant implicitly tells magistrates that they
need not take much care in reviewing warrant applications, since
their mistakes will from now on have virtually no consequence: If
their decision to issue a warrant was correct, the evidence will
be admitted; if their decision was incorrect but the police
relied in good faith on the warrant, the evidence will also be
admitted.

Inevitably, the care and attention devoted to such an

inconsequential chore will dwindle.

Althdugh the Court is

correct to note that magistrates do not share the same stake in
•the outcome of a criminal case as the police, they nevertheless
need to appreciate that their role is of some moment in order to
continue performing the important task of carefully reviewing

14 The authors of a recent study of the warrant process in seven
cities concluded that application of a good faith exception where
an officer relies upon a warrant "would further encourage police
officers to seek out the less inquisitive magistrates and to rely
on boilerplate formulae, thereby lessening the value of search
warrants overall. Consequently, the benefits of adoption of a
broad good faith exception in terms of a few additional
prosecutions appears to be outweighed by the harm to the quality
of the entire search warrant process and the criminal justice
system in general." Van Duizend, Sutton & Carter, The Search
Warrant Process: Preconceptions, Perceptions, Practices 8-12
(1983). See also Stewart, supra, at 1403.

I

warrant applications.

Today's decision effectively removes that

incentive. 15
Moreover, the good faith exception will encourage police to
provide only the bare minimum of information in future warrant
applications.

Since the police will now know that if they can

secure a warrant, so long as the circumstances of its issuance
are not "entirely unreasonable," ante, at 24, all police conduct
pursuant to that warrant will be insulated from further judicial
review. 16

The clear incentive that operated in the past to

15 Just last Term in Illinois v. Gates,
U.S.
(1983), the
Court noted:
"Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to
allow that official to determine probable cause; his action
cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.
In order to ensure that such an abdication of the magistrate's
duty does not occur, courts must continue .to conscientiously
review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are
issued." Id., at
After today's decls1on, there will little
reason for-reviewing courts to conduct such a conscientious
review; rather, these courts will be more likely to focus simply
on the question of police good faith.
The Court's confident
1prediction that such review will continue to be conducted, see
ante, at A5-26, it is difficult to believe that busy courts faced
with heavy dockets will take the time to render. essentially
advisory opinions concerning the constitutionality of the
magistrate's decision before considering the of£icer's good
faith.
16As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has observed
in this regard:
"If a magistrate's issuance of a warrant were to be, as the
government would have it, an all but conclusive determination of
the validity of the search and of .the admissibility of the
evidence seized thereby, police officers might have a substantial
incentive to submit their warrant applications to the least
demanding magistrates, since once the warrant was issued, it
would be exceedingly difficult later to exclude any evidence
seized in the resulting search even if the warrant was issued
without probable cause •••• For practical purposes, therefore,
the standard of probable cause might be diluted to that required
by the least demanding official authorized to issue warrants,
Footnote continued on next page.

establish probable cause adequately because reviewing courts
would examine the magistrate's judgment carefully, see, e.g.,
Franks v. Delaware, 438
States, 362

u.s.

u.s.

154, 169-170 (1978) : · Jones v. United

257, 271-272 (1960): Giordenello v. United

States, 357 U.S. 480, 483 (1958), has now been so completely
vitiated that the police need only show that it was not "entirely
unreasonable" under the circumstances of a particular case for
them to believe that the warrant they were issued was valid.
ante, at 24.

See

The long run effect will unquestionably be to

undermine the integrity of the warrant process.
Finally, even if one were to assume, as the Court
apparently does, that police are hobbled by inflexible and hypertechnical warrant procedures, today's decision cannot be
justified.

This is because, given the relaxed standard for

assessing probable cause established just.·last Term in Illinois
v. Gates,

u.s .

(1983), the Court's newly fashioned good

.faith exception, when applied in the warrant context, will
rarely, if ever, offer any greater flexibility tor police than
..

the Gates standard already supplies.

In Gates; ~ the Court held

that "the task of an issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, ••• there is
a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place."

Id., at

The task of a

even if this fell well below what the Fourth Amendment required."
United States v. Karanthanos, 531 F. 2d 26, 34 (CA2 1976).

reviewing court is confined to determining whether "the
magistrate had a 'substantial basis' for concluding that probable
cause existed."

Ibid.

Given such a relaxed standard, it is

virtually inconceivable that a reviewing court, when faced with a
defendant's motion to suppress, could first find that a warrant
was invalid under the new Gates standard, but then, at the same
time, find that a police officer's reliance on such an invalid
warrant was nevertheless "objectively reasonable" under the test
/
announced today. 1 7 Since the two standards overlap so
completely, it is unlikely that a warrant could be found invalid
under Gates and yet the police reliance upon it could be seen as
objectively reasonable; otherwise, we would have to entertain the
mind-boggling concept of objectively reasonable reliance upon an
objectively unreasonable warrant.
This paradox, as JUSTICE STEVENS suggests, see ante, at

--'

perhaps explains the Courtrs

~nwillingness

to remand No. 82-

, 1771 for reconsideration in light of Gates, for it is quite
likely that on remand the Court of Appeals would . find no
violation of the Fourth Amendment, thereby demon$trating that the
supposed need for the good faith exception in this context is
more apparent than real.

Therefore, although the Court's

decisions are clearly limited to the situation in which police

17 see Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and
Beyond, 69 Iowa 551, 588-589 (1984); Wasserstrom, The Incredible
Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 257 (1984): La
Fave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing
"Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 307 (1982).

officers reasonably rely upon an apparently valid warrant in
conducting a search, I am not at all confident that the exception
unleashed today will remain so confined.

Indeed, . the full impact

of the Court's regrettable decision will not be felt until the
Court attempts to extend this rule to situations

i~

which the

police have conducted a warrantless search solely on the basis of
their own judgment about the existence of probable cause and
exigent circumstances.

When that question is finally posed, I

for one will not be surprised if my colleagues decide once again
that we simply cannot afford to protect Fourth Amendment rights.

IV
When the public, as it quite properly has done in the past
as well as in the present, demands that those in government
increas_e their efforts to combat crime, i.t is all too easy for
those government officials to seek expedient solutions.

In

contrast to such costly and difficult measrires as building more
~risons,

improving law enforcement methods,

oi

hiring more

prosecutors and judges to relieve the overburdened court systems
.
in the country's metropolitan areas, the relaxatton of Fourth
'

Amendment standards seems a tempting, costless means of meeting
the public's demand for better law enforcement.

In the long run,

however, we as a society pay a heavy price for such expediency,
for as Justice Jackson observed, the rights guaranteed in the
Fourth Amendment "are not mere second-class rights but belong in
the catalog of indispensable freedoms."
States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949)

Brinegar v. United

(dissenting opinion).

lost, such rights are difficult to recover.

Once

There is hope,

-

40 -

however, that in time this Court or some later Court will recall
how precious these freedoms are and will restore Fourth Amendment
rights to the high place where they belong in our society.
I dissent.
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